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iPreface
This paper entails a master’s thesis carried out at the Department of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science at the University of Stavanger. The work spread across the entire spring
semester in 2015. The work introduces a new sharing system with high focus on security aspects.
The sharing system is sufficient for sharing all types of files, and its implementation allows for
easy incorporation into existing systems/applications.
The paper assumes that the reader has a background in computer science, but topics that
are important to the system’s implementation while being above average in complexity will con-
tain a rather elaborate introduction.
Stavanger, June 12, 2015
Morten Stangeland Salte
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Abstract
This work introduces a new and secure mechanism for sharing files. In providing a complete
implementation of a relatively recent cryptographic primitive known as proxy re-encryption,
the thesis sharing system design enables file owners to store their private files in an arbitrary
location while delegating access to others through the BitTorrent protocol.
A proxy re-encryption scheme involves, as the name implies, re-encryption of already en-
crypted content known as ciphertexts. To clarify, a file owner may initially encrypt a private file
before uploading it to an arbitrary location on the Internet. Subsequently, the file owner may
provide an untrusted third party known as the proxy instance with a special key. In possession
of said special key, known as the re-encryption key, the proxy instance (the sharing system) is ca-
pable of re-encrypting the ciphertext originally intended for party A (the source) such that party
B (the destination) can decrypt it. After re-encryption, Party B may decrypt the ciphertext with
his or her secret decryption key, all while the sharing system (proxy) never need to access to the
underlying plaintext.
The genius of the proxy re-encryption primitive entails that while a proxy instance is capable
of delegating access to files that the respective file owner has permitted, a faulty or compromised
proxy instance is unable to perform any hazardous actions without the file owner’s say so. This is
because the proxy instance has no means to access the underlying files. The proxy instance only
has access to the original ciphertext and the re-encryption keys, both of which the file owner
generates and may be publicly available without security concern. The thesis sharing system
design inherits these very attractive properties.
As mentioned, this work also relies on the BitTorrent protocol. This protocol is responsible
for providing the sharing system’s file transfer capability. More specifically, when users delegate
access to their files, they actually delegate access to encrypted metadata files known as torrent
files.
To clarify, if Bob wants to share a picture with Alice, he does so by letting the sharing system
generate and encrypt a torrent file corresponding to the picture. Moreover, Bob lets the sys-
tem generate a re-encryption key that enables re-encryption of ciphertexts intended for Bob for
decryption by Alice’s secret decryption key. Bob then provides the system with the encrypted
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torrent and the re-encryption key. When Alice makes an inquiry about the picture, the system
will re-encrypt the picture’s encrypted torrent file so that Alice may decrypt it. Once Alice has
decrypted the torrent file, she can download the picture through a BitTorrent client.
For this to work in a secure manner, the thesis sharing system design makes some modifi-
cations to the BitTorrent protocol. More specifically, it provides a customized embedded Bit-
Torrent tracker, which is responsible for coordinating file transfer between its users. To ensure
secure file transfer, the BitTorrent tracker implements some cryptographic protocols while si-
multaneously enforcing its clients to do so as well.
Finally, to ensure easy incorporation of the sharing system into existing applications, all user
interaction is available through a standardized web service interface.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter contains sections introducing the thesis work in a structured manner. First, a re-
view of the thesis background will take place. This includes a description of the problem that
this work tries to solve, as well as a mention of why it is necessary to make such an attempt. Sub-
sequently, the chapter presents an overview of the thesis objectives, its primary contribution, its
limitations and its approach. Finally, the chapter rounds off with a paper roadmap, including
what to expect from its remaining chapters.
1.1 Background
This work tries to solve the problem of sharing files in a secure and convenient manner over
the Internet. In recent years, an increasing number of user’s files move from being stored lo-
cally on personal computers to reside in large data centers accessible in the cloud. While this is
very convenient and saves users from having to invest in large hard drives and other expensive
hardware, it introduces the problem that the owner of a file is not in complete control of the file
anymore. In fact, in many cases, the files are actually located on foreign servers where there are
legal prejudices severely differentiating from those enforced by the file owner’s own domestic
laws and regulations.
When researching the practices of today’s most popular cloud storage providers (CSPs), it
quickly became clear that many of them are severely lacking in security areas [11]. Firstly, most
providers does not offer any form of client side encryption. This means that if there is encryption
2
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present at all, this happens on the server side as the files arrive. This is concerning as it means
that the providers themselves are the key holders and thereby capable of decryption. In fact,
several providers openly admit to these capabilities, but they all promise that they would never
decrypt any data without a good reason. Moreover, it is a common claim that only a handful of
their engineers have the necessary credentials to access the decryption functionality. However,
from a user’s point of view, these promises might not be satisfactory. They are probably not,
especially in light of the recent exposure of private content covered by the media. Moreover,
who decides what a good reason for allowing decryption of files is? It is a known fact that laws
and regulations of many countries lets government officials inquire about the content of files
serviced by domestic CSPs.
When users of CSPs that only provide server side encryption systems wants to share files
with other users, security is often more or less abandoned. Amazingly enough, upon sharing,
the CSPs will in some cases simply decrypt the files permanently and let the recipient user(s)
access them as well.
While it is true that some CSPs do offer client side encryption, this approach also contain
weaknesses once users try to share their files with others [16]. Client side encryption means that
the data encryption occurs prior to upload. When users share files in client side encrypted cloud
environments, the CSPs still manage to decrypt the respective files before encrypting them with
the destination’s public key. This means that at some point during this process, the CSPs handle
the files as plaintext.
These problems alone solely keep the discussion open about whether these systems are good
enough. Moreover, they sparked the idea of this thesis work, which tries to offer a new system
for sharing files between users without providing yet another CSP.
The thesis work provides a sharing system whose encryption algorithm is a particular proxy
re-encryption scheme. In a proxy re-encryption scheme, an untrusted third party referred to as
the proxy instance is able to convert ciphertexts encrypted for party A into ciphertexts that party
B can decrypt. This conversion works without the necessity to access the plaintext. By using
such a scheme, this work’s (untrusted) sharing system is able to provide its users with a secure
sharing system while remaining ignorant as to the contents of its users’ files. There is no way
for the sharing system, which acts as the proxy instance, to access the file content. All the infor-
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mation at the disposal of the sharing system may be publicly available to anyone. The sharing
system acts as an application that provides its users with a proxy re-encryption implementation.
Additionally, the sharing system manages its user’s publicly available cryptographic keys in such
a way that it knows which of its users have access to what content.
The intention of the sharing system is for its incorporation into existing systems to be seam-
less, without introducing yet another registration schema for the users.
The following literature encompasses the main portion of the survey for this work:
• Secure Cloud Storage Sharing Through Proxy Re-Encryption [11]
• Divertible Protocols and Atomic Proxy Cryptography [3]
• Improved Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes with Applications to Secure Distributed Storage [7]
• "To Share or not to Share" in Client-Side Encrypted Clouds [16]
• On the Implementation of Pairing-based Cryptography [9]
• Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent [6]
1.2 Contribution
The following will clarify what the thesis work’s primary contribution is. Firstly, the following
shows the primary objectives of the thesis work in no particular order. Design and develop a file
sharing system that:
1. Satisfies today’s security requirements
2. Handles arbitrary file types and sizes
3. Enables file owners to host their files on arbitrary locations
4. Does not require file owners to remain online indefinitely
5. Can easily be incorporated into existing applications
6. Works on all platforms
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From the above, it is apparent that the core contribution of the thesis work is a file shar-
ing system design. Additionally, as we shall see, a huge part of the sharing system’s strengths
relates to its underlying cryptographic emphasis on a proxy re-encryption scheme. The thesis
sharing system implements the AFGH [7] algorithm to its fullest, which is one of many proxy re-
encryption schemes. This particular scheme fits very well for a sharing system and is a scheme
whose security is not compromised by obvious weaknesses.
When talking about limitations of the thesis work, it makes sense to pinpoint the fact that its
primary focus is on providing a secure sharing system. The security regarding the underlying
storage of the files is outside its scope. In other words, while the sharing system is able to provide
satisfactory security during the sharing of files, the security of the files when they reside on the
user’s hard drives will remain unchanged. This becomes a problem if the users are hosting their
files on certain cloud storage providers’ (CSP) servers.
While this may seem like a rather huge limitation, it is easy to see that the sharing system is
able to provide exceptional security improvements if compared to what goes on with the files
when they process through many of the popular CSPs own sharing systems and practices.
1.3 Approach
The following elaborates briefly on the approach used to meet the requirements of the thesis
objectives. The design and implementation chapter (Chapter 3) will contain a more complete
walkthrough, including the why’s and how’s.
When starting development of a file sharing system that needed to be secure, it was initially
required to do some research to find out which of today’s popular cryptographic algorithms that
are considered secure. In addition to answering the initial question about secure algorithms,
this process found that proxy re-encryption would be a perfect cryptographic primitive for the
thesis sharing system. This is because such a scheme would eliminate the primary deficiency
of many popular sharing systems, namely the need for decryption of files that others should be
able to access. In proxy re-encryption schemes, re-encryption can occur without the need for
decryption. However, a proxy re-encryption scheme would only be satisfactory if using the cor-
rect algorithm. In other words, the respective algorithm implementation would need to satisfy
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specific properties. It turns out that some of the first proxy re-encryption algorithms contain
some rather problematic issues. A more thorough elaboration on this topic follows later in the
paper.
In addition to being cryptographically secure, the sharing system’s file transfer process itself
would need to be efficient while still working for arbitrary file types and sizes. The BitTorrent
protocol ended up satisfying these initial requirements very well. However, the security of Bit-
Torrent was questionable. This led to some additional research into how to go about securing
the BitTorrent protocol and what performance disadvantages that would potentially cause. In
the end, enabling encryption capabilities in the BitTorrent protocol did not impediment the per-
formance too badly, especially for this particular application area. The additional overhead was
negligible.
While the BitTorrent protocol solved the primary objective of supporting arbitrary file types
and sizes, it also fit well with meeting other objectives. More specifically, with utilizing the Bit-
Torrent protocol, file owners are capable of hosting their files on arbitrary locations while simul-
taneously not being required to remain online for the complete sharing process. By utilizing this
protocol, users can enter and leave the distribution of a file as they please, including the original
source. Moreover, if a file is shared with multiple recipients, it is sufficient that at least one user
in possession of the complete file is available at any given time. A more complete description of
the BitTorrent protocol follows in Chapter 2.
Finally, since the intention for the sharing system was for easy incorporation into existing
applications in a platform independent fashion, an examination of different exposure practices
followed. The most applicable ended up being to provide a user interface through the HTTP pro-
tocol. This way it would be possible to ensure security by enabling SSL/TLS capabilities on the
corresponding web server. Moreover, all platforms and programming languages have standard-
ized methodologies for invoking HTTP requests and thus easy incorporation is a fact. Providing
an application-programming interface (API) through the HTTP protocol is often synonymous
with a web service.
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1.4 Roadmap
The rest of the paper consists of the following. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the scientific
background of the thesis work. Chapter 3 goes into detail on its design and implementation
phase. Chapter 4 goes through the various experimental results, including example use cases
and the system’s corresponding output. Chapter 5 contains the paper’s discussion while Chapter
6 provides some concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Scientific Background
As this work builds upon a handful of academic areas, this chapter will introduce them in turn.
Areas that are of higher relevance to this work receives a more thorough elaboration than other
areas. Each of the areas’ domains consists of a wide variety of terminology, many of which have
a high frequency of use throughout the paper. To allow for this, this chapter seeks to bring the
reader to some extent of understanding for the most important topics, if he or she is not already
there.
2.1 An Overview of Cryptographic Algorithms and Protocols
When talking about information security and cryptography, it is common to divide the field into
four main categories [12]. These categories are symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption,
data integrity algorithms and authentication protocols.
Symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes are similar in that they both provide a mech-
anism for concealing the contents of a message so that unwanted parties cannot access it. How-
ever, they are rather different in their respective underlying implementations.
2.1.1 Symmetric/Secret Key Encryption
Symmetric encryption schemes lets two parties communicate secretly by being possession of
the same secret key that only they know. Both parties will use the same secret key to encrypt
and decrypt the messages exchanged between them. This process is very challenging to initiate,
8
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as the two parties must be able to exchange the secret key between them, without a third party
learning about it. However, after the key exchange, symmetric encryption schemes are very
effective.
2.1.2 Asymmetric/Public Key Encryption
Because public key cryptosystems lays the fundament for the cryptographic primitive known
as proxy re-encryption, which is highly used in this work, the paper will pay more attention to
detail and elaborate more thoroughly when discussing this topic compared to the other crypto-
graphic algorithms and protocols.
Asymmetric encryption schemes, synonymous with public key encryption schemes, are able
to solve the key exchange problem of symmetric encryption. Specifically, in asymmetric en-
cryption, both parties possess their own unique key pair. The key pair consists of one secret key
that only they know and a public key that they can publish for anyone to see. A very important
property of this key pair is that the public key generation function takes the corresponding se-
cret key as its input parameter. In other words, there is a mathematical relationship between a
party’s public key and its corresponding secret key. However, if the scheme is secure, there is no
practical way to reverse engineer the secret key by only knowing the public key.
When the sender wants to encrypt a message, it does so by using the recipient’s public key.
Because the recipient’s public key evolves from his or her secret key, the recipient is the only
party capable of decryption. Since asymmetric encryption solves the key exchange problem, it
is very attractive. However, because its security typically bases on computations on exception-
ally large prime numbers, over 300 digits long, its performance suffers compared to symmetric
encryption. Because of this, it is not uncommon to use an asymmetric scheme to exchange keys
between two parties, before subsequently switching to a symmetric scheme for the following
communications.
Below is an overview of what most public key cryptosystems relies on for security. As we shall
see, the computationally hard problems making public key cryptosystems secure are either RSA-
based or based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Moreover, DLP-based cryptosystems
are either ElGamal-based or based on the elliptic curve algebraic structure.
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• RSA-based
• DLP-based
– ElGamal-based
– Elliptic curve-based
To understand these terms, we need to look closer at the history of public key cryptography.
The RSA algorithm and the Integer Factorization Problem
The term RSA-based origins from the well-known RSA public key cryptosystem developed by
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978. RSA has since then been known as the most widely ac-
cepted public key cryptosystem [12]. The hardness of RSA relies on the tediousness of factoring
large integers, more specifically the product of two exceptionally large primes. To explain this
further, the following describes the RSA algorithm.
Let p and q be two exceptionally large prime numbers. Continue by computing n = pq .
Compute φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Select e such that e is relatively prime to and less than φ(n).
Moreover, select d such that d ≡ e−1 mod φ(n). Both parties must know the value of n. The
sender knows the value of e while the recipient knows the value of d . In other words, the public
key is represented as PK = (e,n) while the secret key is represented as SK = (d ,n).
To encrypt a message using the RSA scheme, given the plaintext M < n, the ciphertext be-
comes C = M e mod n. Similarly, in decryption of the ciphertext C , the recovered message be-
comes M =C d mod n.
As we can see, the security of the RSA cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of recovering the
two prime numbers q and p by only knowing the publicly available value n. This is a very hard
problem. However, with computing power growing exceptionally in recent years, the length of
n in bits, known as the key size, must be large (preferably several thousand bits). By increas-
ing the key size to increase the security, we must do so at the cost of computational efficiency
(introducing more overhead).
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Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal and the Discrete Logarithm Problem
The discrete logarithm problem refers to the difficulty of computing x given only g and g x . As
mentioned, it is possible to divide the discrete logarithm problem into two categories, namely
ElGamal-based and elliptic curve-based. The term ElGamal-based origins from the ElGamal
public key cryptosystem, which bases on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is a brilliant technique enabling two parties to
agree secretly on an integer value. Its introduction in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman solved one
of the major problems with symmetric/secret key cryptosystems, namely how to transfer the
shared secret key between the communicating parties in a secure fashion. The protocol works
by letting two parties A and B start by publicly sharing a prime number q and an integer p such
that p < q and p being a primitive root of q . Followed by this, they each select a secret value
S A < q and SB < q respectively. Moreover, they publicly send the values P A = pS A mod q and
PB = pSB mod q to the other party. Once this is done, each party can compute the shared value
K A = P S AB mod q = KB = P SBA mod q . The key exchange is complete. As we can see, the security
of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol relates to the difficulty of computing the secret
value S A or SB given only P A or PB together with p. As mentioned before, this problem is the
discrete logarithm problem.
Additionally, there are two more hard problems related to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
namely the computational and decisional Diffie-Hellman problems. The computational Diffie-
Hellman problem is that given g , g x , g y , compute g x y . The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem
is that given g , g x , g y , g z , determine if x y = z. However, no matter how hard these two ad-
ditional problems are, the discrete logarithm problem is more important. If you can solve the
discrete logarithm problem, you can solve the computational and the decisional Diffie-Hellman
problems as well [9].
The ElGamal cryptosystem arrived in 1984 when Taher Elgamal announced it as a public key
scheme basing on the discrete logarithm problem. Similar to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol, the global elements of the ElGamal scheme are a prime number q and an integer a < q
and a being a primitive root of q . From this, key generation works by selecting a random integer
SK < q − 1 as the secret key. Moreover, the public key is computed as PK = aSK mod q and
published together with q and a as the tuple (q, a,PK ).
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Encrypting a message M < q works by first selecting a random integer k < q and com-
puting K = PK k mod q . The ciphertext can then be encrypted as a tuple C = (C1,C2) where
C1 = ak mod q and C2 = K M mod q . Note that k must be randomly generated for each en-
cryption; it should never be re-used for subsequent encryptions. To recover the plaintext, the
recipient computes K =C SK1 mod q before recovering the message M = (C2K−1) mod q .
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography refers to the application of the algebraic structure of elliptic curves
over finite fields. The introduction of elliptic curves in cryptography is relatively recent, and is
attractive because it is able to provide RSA-like security with far smaller key sizes. Smaller keys
are both more practical and more computationally efficient as it reduces overhead. However,
since elliptic curve theory is harder to explain and understand, it has the side effect of being sig-
nificantly more difficult to cryptanalyze. Cryptanalysis refers to the careful examination of cryp-
tographic algorithms. If this process is easy, it means that more people will be able to perform it
in a satisfactory level. More people performing the cryptanalysis will increase the probability of
discovering weaknesses before unwelcome parties can attack them.
The following will try to explain elliptic curve cryptography to the extent where the reader
is able to understand its basic principles and purpose. Since elliptic curves is a rather complex
mathematical subject, a complete review is outside the scope of this paper.
To keep it simple, an elliptic curve is a set of points that satisfy a specific mathematical equa-
tion [12, 15]. More specifically, the equation for an elliptic curve is of the form y2 = x3+ax+b.
Figure 2.1 shows the plot of y2 = x3−x+1.
When plotting such an equation, several properties appear that are interesting to cryptogra-
phers. One of these properties is the horizontal symmetry, which enables the reflection of any
point on the curve over the x-axis to remain the same curve. Another interesting property is that
any non-vertical line will intersect the curve at a maximum of three points. In other words, by
taking any two points on the curve and drawing a line through them, the line will intersect at the
curve at exactly one more point. When arriving at this point, it is possible to make a dotted line
straight up if working above the x-axis or straight down if working below the x-axis. This way the
dotted line will inevitably hit the curve’s reflection on the other side of the x-axis. The procedure
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Figure 2.1: A plot of the elliptic curve y2 = x3−x+1
Figure 2.2: A plot of the dotted elliptic curve y2 = x3−x+1
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of making dotted lines from the destination point goes by the term “dotting” and is illustrated
in Figure 2.2.
It is possible to dot any two points on the curve to get a new point. It is also possible to string
dots together in a sequence of dotting procedures. It turns out, if we have two points A and B,
an initial point dotted with itself n times to arrive at a final point and the first point is a hard
problem. Cryptographers love hard problems, especially the ones like this that are easy to do
but hard to undo. This is the basis for the security of elliptic curve cryptography.
To summarize, an elliptic curve cryptosystem works by picking a large prime as the maxi-
mum, a curve equation and a public point on the curve. A secret key is a random number k
while the public key is the public point dotted with itself k times. In elliptic curve cryptography,
computing the secret key k with only knowing the public point on the curve goes by term “the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem”.
2.1.3 Data Integrity Algorithms
When talking about data integrity algorithms, we are looking for a way to protect messages from
alteration. A very common mechanism used for this purpose are hash functions. Hash functions
accept messages or arbitrary length and produces a fixed sized output. Good hash functions
will ensure a good avalanche effect, that is, changing a single bit of the input should produce
an output with at least half of its bits changed. If a message source appends the hash value of
the message to the message itself, it is easy for the recipient to ensure integrity of the message.
Running the message through a hash function and comparing the output with the hash value
appended to the original message will reveal foul play with very high probability.
2.1.4 Authentication Protocols
Authentication protocols exist to verify the identity of entities. Message Authentication Proto-
cols (MAC) lets recipient entities verify that the source of the message, i.e. the sender, is authen-
tic. User authentication protocols however, is the building block of the vast majority of access
control protocols, and entails the process of providing credentials to a system that implies au-
thenticity. Typical examples include passwords, PIN numbers, fingerprints, voice etc.
CHAPTER 2. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 15
2.2 SSL/TLS and HTTPS
In the early years of the Web, people used protocols such as Telnet and the File Transfer Proto-
col (FTP) to access information. Moreover, the combination of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) and HTML provided users with a graphical user interface. These protocols often needed
to transfer sensitive data such as usernames and passwords to the underlying web servers. As
long as these communications was running over HTTP, there was in practice no security present.
The HTTPS protocol, or HTTP Secure, is a protocol that combines the HTTP protocol with
the SSL/TLS protocol to provide a secure communication over HTTP. The following will elabo-
rate more thoroughly on what SSL and TLS is. However, the explanations is still be kept rather
simplified.
2.2.1 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS)
The SSL protocol, or the Secure Sockets Layer protocol, is actually two layers of protocols de-
signed to use the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) to provide a secure and reliable end-to-
end communication. Netscape first developed SSL version 1.0 in 1994. SSL is one of the most
widely deployed security protocols on the Internet [17]. The protocol is able to provide authen-
tication, integrity and confidentiality for two communicating parties.
TLS is a standardization initiative with the goal of providing a standard implementation of
SSL. Because of this, SSL and TLS are often synonymous. TLS version 1.0 took over after SSL
version 3.0 in 1999. As of 2015, TLS 1.2 is the established version, with version 1.3 on the horizon
[14].
The most important protocol in the layers provided by SSL/TLS is the Handshake Protocol.
This protocol allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to agree on an encryp-
tion algorithm and a Message Authentication Code (MAC)-algorithm [12].
Before any data transmission happens between a client and a server, SSL/TLS initializes the
Handshake Protocol, which is comprised of the following four phases.
Establish Security Capabilities Initiated by the client establishing security capabilities includ-
ing protocol version, cipher suite (set of supported cryptographic algorithms), compres-
sion method and initial random numbers.
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Server Authentication and Key Exchange Server sends one or more X.509 certificates for au-
thentication, performs the key exchange and requests client certificate.
Client Authentication and Key Exchange Client sends a certificate reply and participates in the
key exchange.
Finish Finalizes the secure connection setup.
It is worth noting that the key exchange process of SSL/TLS supports either RSA or a variation
of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm.
After the Handshake Protocol, SSL/TLS initializes the Record Protocol. The Record Protocol
is responsible for securing the application data with the keys established in the Handshake Pro-
tocol. The supported encryption algorithms are symmetric in respect to the established keys.
They can be both stream ciphers or block ciphers. Stream ciphers are algorithms that encrypt a
digital data stream one bit or one byte at a time. On the other hand, block ciphers encrypt blocks
of plaintext producing a ciphertext block of equal length. The following shows an overview of
cryptographic algorithms supported by TLS. It is worth noting that as of February 2015, the
Internet Engineering Task Force [30] (IETF) published a so-called Request for Comment (RFC
7465) where they state that they have reached consensus in the decision of prohibiting use of
the RC4 stream cipher in TLS [29].
Block Ciphers DES, 3DES, DES40, IDEA, RC2
Stream Ciphers RC4
2.3 Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy re-encryption is a relatively new cryptographic primitive. While regular symmetric or
asymmetric encryption schemes are able to provide two parties with a secure communication
channel, proxy re-encryption takes the idea a step further. Specifically, proxy re-encryption is
a technique for letting a proxy instance re-encrypt an already encrypted message (i.e. cipher-
text), so that another secret key can decrypt it. This may sound far-fetched and insecure, but
do not worry. The re-encryption process will not work without the original sender’s say so, as
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the sender itself generates the re-encryption key by combining its own secret key and the recip-
ient’s public key. Because of these properties, it is common to categorize proxy re-encryption
cryptosystems as extended cases of a public key cryptosystem.
To explain the significance of a proxy re-encryption scheme, the following example is often
used [7, 5, 3]. Suppose that Alice and Bob works for the same company and that Bob is Alice’s
subordinate. Many people send e-mails to Alice containing important company information.
When they do this, they of course encrypt the e-mails with Alice’s public encryption key. This
will ensure that only Alice can read the messages intended for her. However, if Alice is out sick
or on vacation, messages for Alice will pile up in her inbox without anyone able to access the
important information contained in them. To avoid this, Alice may grant Bob temporary access
to read her e-mails while she is unavailable. To achieve this without Alice having to reveal her
secret key, a proxy re-encryption scheme fits like hand in glove. All Alice has to do is to generate
a re-encryption key by using her own secret key and Bob’s public key. By providing Bob (or the
e-mail server) with the re-encryption key, Bob (or the e-mail server) is capable of re-encrypting
the encrypted messages intended for Alice so that Bob can decrypt them with his own secret
key.
In theory, there are other workarounds for the above e-mail scenario as well. By having Alice
supply the e-mail server with her secret key, the server will be able to decrypt her incoming e-
mails before encrypting them with Bob’s public key. This is a huge security concern though. In
this approach, there must be complete trust between Alice and the e-mail server. Alice must be
able to trust the e-mail server to keep her secret key secret. Relying on trusted parties is never
a good idea in cryptography, so abandoning this approach for its naivety is eminent. Another
possibility would be for Alice to remain online at all times, where she would manually decrypt
her incoming e-mails with her secret decryption key, before encrypting them with Bob’s public
key. Subsequently, Alice would forward the e-mails to Bob. The problem with this approach is
its lacking practicality.
The concept of proxy re-encryption origins from 1998 when Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss
(BBS) published their paper titled Divertible Protocols and Atomic Proxy Cryptography [3]. Their
scheme bases on the ElGamal public key cryptosystem and is perfectly capable of providing the
desired re-encryption function. However, their scheme contains some rather problematic weak-
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nesses for practical use. More specifically, it is bidirectional, its delegation function is transitive
and it is prone to collusion between the proxy and either of the parties [5].
To elaborate on this, the scheme’s bidirectional property means that a single re-encryption
key generated for re-encrypting messages intended for Alice so that Bob can decrypt them, also
enables re-encrypting of messages intended for Bob so that Alice can decrypt them. In other
words, the re-encryption key works both ways. In practice, this means that if Alice wants to let
Bob decrypt her incoming e-mails while she is unavailable, Bob must agree to revoke some of
his own privacy in the process. By granting Bob the privilege to read Alice’s e-mails, in theory,
Alice will be able to reverse the process and to read Bob’s e-mails. In conclusion, the scheme is
only viable if there is a mutual trust relationship between Alice and Bob. That is rarely the case.
The scheme’s delegation function being transitive means that the proxy instance is capable
of providing delegations between two parties that have never agreed on it. In other words, the
proxy instance is capable of re-encrypting Alice’s ciphertexts not only for Bob, but also for a third
party Charlie (without Alice’s consent).
Finally, the collusion issue present in the scheme enables a fraudulent proxy instance to
cooperate with either Alice or Bob to learn the other party’s secret key. This is alarming, as secret
keys should as the name implies, always be kept secret.
Since BBS introduced their scheme, several improved proxy re-encryption schemes have
surfaced. There is no perfect scheme, but there are different schemes solving different chal-
lenges. Therefore, when deciding on which scheme to use, one should do so based on the spe-
cific application’s requirements.
As we have seen, the BBS scheme contains three major weaknesses. To reiterate, these weak-
nesses are its bidirectionality, its transitivity and its weakness against collusion. The thesis shar-
ing system implements a proxy re-encryption scheme called the AFGH algorithm. Similar to the
BBS scheme, AFGH bases on the ElGamal public key cryptosystem. However, it also bases on the
algebraic setting known as bilinear maps. As we shall see, the AFGH scheme is able to remedy
all of the weaknesses of BBS. The following section describes the AFGH scheme in detail.
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2.4 Bilinear Maps and the AFGH Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
In the previous section, a brief discussion of proxy re-encryption in general took place. While
proxy re-encryption schemes clearly have their use, the aforementioned BBS scheme is not
suited for many applications because of its weaknesses. In 2005, Ateniese, Fu, Green and Ho-
henberger (AFGH) published their improved proxy re-encryption scheme [7]. Their scheme
bases on the ElGamal cryptosystem (like BBS) and bilinear maps. The AFGH scheme is very
attractive as it remedies all the major weaknesses of BBS.
2.4.1 Pairing-Based Cryptography and Bilinear Maps
To be able to understand the AFGH algorithm, we first need to make sure we understand what
bilinear maps are. The following will introduce pairing-based cryptography. A pairing, or a
bilinear map, is able to provide cyclic groups with additional properties [8, 9]. To understand
this and grasp the significance, we need to know what groups and cyclic groups in particular
are.
Groups
In discrete mathematics, a group (G, ·) is a set of elements G together with an abstract binary
operation ’·’ satisfying the following conditions.
Closure For all a,b ² G, a ·b ² G
Associativity For all a,b,c ² G, (a ·b) · c = a · (b · c)
Identity Element There exists e ² G, such that for all a ² G, a ·e = a = e ·a
Inverse Element For any a ² G, there exists a−1 ² G, such that a ·a−1 = e = a−1 ·a
A group’s binary operation could be anything from addition, multiplication, mapping etc. The
definition of groups does not specify the operation.
To give a couple of examples of groups, the following shows two groups (Zn ,+) and (Z∗n ,•)
for n = 8. Note that n is the modulus in both of these groups.
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(Zn ,+) Z8 = {0,1,2,3, . . . ,7} (2.1)
(Z∗n ,•) Z∗8 = {1,3,5,7} (2.2)
Note that in group 2.1, the operation is the addition modulus 8 while in group 2.2 the oper-
ation is the multiplication modulus 8.
A subgroup is a group (H, ·)⊆ (G, ·) satisfying the following conditions.
Closure For all a,b ²H, a ·b ²H
Inverse Element For all a ²H, a−1 ²H
A group is cyclic if the following conditions apply.
• Denote g k as (g · g · g · . . . · g ) (k times, where k is an integer)
• Every element in G is a power g k of a fixed element g in G. The element g is the generator
of G, or < g >= G
• Given the order (number of elements) of the group is |G| =m, thenG= {e, g , g 2, g 3, . . . , g m−1}
where e is the identify element.
The following shows an example of a cyclic group.
< 2,• > =Z∗11 = {2,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,210} mod 11= {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10} (2.3)
Bilinear Maps
Let G1 and GT be cyclic groups of prime order q . Let g be a generator of G1. A bilinear map e is
then an efficiently computable function e :G1×G2 →GT satisfying the following.
Bilinearity For all g1 ² G1, g2 ² G2, a, b ² Zq , then e(g a1 , g
b
2 )= e(g1, g2)ab
Non-degeneracy If G1 = < g1 >, G2 = < g2 >, then GT = < e(g1, g2)>
Computability The computation of e must be efficient
The following shows a simplified example of a bilinear map e.
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For n = 11, e :Z∗11×Z+10 →Z∗11
(g ,k)→ e(g ,k)= g k mod11
e(g a ,r ·k)= (g a)r ·k = (g k )a·r
G1 =Z∗11 = < 2,• >, G2 =Z+10 = < 1,+>
More particularly:
G1 = < 4,• >= {4,5,9,3,1}≤Z∗11
G2 <Z+5 = {0,1,2,3,4}
e :G1×G2 →GT
e(g ,k)= g k mod11
Note that in the above example, groups G1, G2 and GT are all of prime order q = 5.
2.4.2 The AFGH Algorithm
Now that we have basic understanding of bilinear maps, it is time to examine the AFGH algo-
rithm in detail. The following describes the algorithm and its components.
Let G1 and G2 be cyclic groups of prime order q . Let e be the bilinear map e :G1×G1 →G2. The
system parameters are random generators g ² G1 and Z = e(g , g ) ² G2.
Key Generation Alice selects her secret key as a random element SK = a ² Zq and computes
her corresponding public key as PK = g a .
Re-Encryption Key Generation Alice delegates to Bob by publishing the re-encryption key RK A→B =
g b/a ² G1. Note that a refers to Alice’s secret key while b refers to Bob’s public key.
Encryption Level 1 To encrypt a message m ²G2 under the public key PK A such that it can only
be decrypted by the secret key holder SK A, compute the ciphertext tuple C = (mZ k , Z ak ).
Note that k is a randomly selected element inZq and that a in this case refers to the public
key PK A.
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Encryption Level 2 To encrypt a message m ² G2 under the public key PK A such that it can be
decrypted by A and its delegatee, compute the ciphertext tuple C = (mZ k , g ak ). Note that
k is a randomly selected element inZq and that a in this case refers to the public key PK A.
Decryption Level 1 To decrypt a level 1 ciphertext C = (α,β) with secret key SK = a, compute
m =α/β1/a .
Decryption Level 2 To decrypt a level 2 ciphertext C = (α,β) with secret key SK = a, compute
m =α/e(β, g 1/a).
Re-Encryption To re-encrypt a level 2 ciphertext for A into a level 1 ciphertext for B, obtain
the re-encryption key RK A→B = g b/a . Continue by changing the ciphertext tuple C A =
(mZ k , g ak ) into CB = (mZ k , Z bk ) where Z bk = e(g ak , g b/a). Note that k is a randomly
selected element in Zq . Moreover, note that g ak =C A[2] and that g b/a =RK A→B .
Comparing the AFGH scheme to the BBS scheme, we see that it is unidirectional under the in-
verse exponent assumption. This means that the proxy cannot compute g b/a by knowing g a/b .
Additionally, the scheme is both non-transitive and collusion resistant, meaning that the proxy
cannot extract a or b from g a/b with help from either party. These three properties are the oppo-
site of those that are part of the BBS scheme. In fact, as we saw in the previous section, the BBS
scheme is bidirectional, prone to collusion and its delegation function is transitive. To conclude,
AFGH is able to remedy the three major weaknesses of BBS.
If we examine the AFGH algorithm closely, we see that the ciphertexts have two different
shapes. One "regular" shape and one re-encrypted shape, or one first level ciphertext and one
second level ciphertext. In a first level ciphertext CLevel1 = (mZ k , Z ak ), the second element is
an element of group G1. In a second level ciphertext CLevel2 = (mZ k , g ak ), the second element
is an element of group G2. Without going into too much detail, this leads to the property that
the AFGH scheme only allows for a single re-encryption of ciphertexts. This conclusion makes
sense in correspondence to the above description of the algorithm. It specifically states that re-
encryption requires a second level ciphertext and that the output of re-encryption is a first level
ciphertext.
There are both pros and cons to the singular re-encryption property. The obvious benefit is
that it guarantees that Bob is not able to further delegate messages that Alice delegated to him.
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However, for some applications such behavior could be desirable. In the end, the application of
the algorithm will decide.
2.5 The BitTorrent Protocol
The BitTorrent protocol is a peer-to-peer protocol commonly used for sharing files over the In-
ternet [2]. To introduce the BitTorrent protocol, this chapter will first briefly look at a more
traditional way of sharing files before diving into the peer-to-peer approach. Subsequently, an
examination of the most apparent benefits of such a scheme follows, particularly with respect
to the BitTorrent protocol.
2.5.1 The Traditional Client/Server Architecture
In the past, file sharing almost exclusively took place by using a client/server architecture. Such
an architecture traditionally entailed storing all data/files on a single centralized server ma-
chine’s hard drive. When the clients wanted to access a file, they had to establish a connec-
tion directly to the server and download the file continuously over the FTP or HTTP protocol.
Consequently, the server would necessarily have to consist of extraordinary hardware specs and
network connectivity to handle the high upload demand of its clients.
By utilizing a client/server architecture for file sharing, some problems are prone to arise.
The most obvious problem is regarding the traffic load applied to the server’s hardware as well
as its network, particularly when handling multiple upload sessions simultaneously. If a single
server contains large files of high interest, multiple clients downloading them simultaneously
may cause reduced performance and reliability on the server. In some cases, high demand of
particular files can even cause the server’s hardware or network interface to fail. If that happens,
clients lose their respective connections to the server, and the establishment of new connections
must wait until operational engineers have intervened to fix the problem. Such failures will also
cause lost progress and frustration for the users. In the worst cases, hard drive malfunctions
may occur because of other various hardware failures, causing sensitive files to be permanently
lost.
These are huge concerns, and the traditional approach of remedying them was to invest
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even more money into hardware and state of the art network capabilities. This was to increase
the server’s upper limits so that it would be less likely to kneel. However, this only postponed
the issues.
In recent years, improvements like load balancing and failover systems have appeared, mak-
ing the problem less of a concern in some application areas. These systems work in that multiple
server instances run in parallel, collaborating with handling the client requests. The idea behind
parallelization of server instances is primarily to achieve increased redundancy. With a redun-
dant server environment, a load balancing system examines the incoming client requests and
determines to which of the server instances it should forward them. This deterministic opera-
tion uses the respective server instance’s current traffic load as a parameter. Instances with low
traffic load at any given time will more likely receive new client requests than instances with
high traffic load. This ensures a balanced load of traffic among the redundant server instances,
significantly decreasing the probability that the servers will crash/kneel.
In the unlikely case of a server instance crashing, a failover system will be able to make sure
that the clients does not suffer from this issue. This entails the forwarding of current connec-
tions as well as new client requests to another redundant server instance.
The client/server architecture is still highly in use, especially in applications in which a peer-
to-peer approach is insufficient. A highly relevant example of such an application area today is
streaming applications such as Netflix and Twitch.tv. This is because these applications typically
require the data to arrive to its clients continuously and in a specific order. However, in appli-
cation areas where the arrival of data can happen in an arbitrary order, a peer-to-peer approach
will likely outperform a client/server architecture, especially on low-end commodity hardware.
2.5.2 The Peer-to-Peer Architecture and the BitTorrent Protocol
The peer-to-peer architecture differs from the traditional client/server architecture in several
areas. The decentralization property of a peer-to-peer architecture is one of the primary differ-
ences compared to the centralized client/server architecture. In a peer-to-peer architecture, the
files are stored on the computers of the respective participants (peers), and file sharing takes
place exclusively between peers within the swarm (collection of peers). This is opposed to the
files residing on the centralized server’s hard drive, where file sharing takes place exclusively be-
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tween a client and the server. Because of the nature of the peer-to-peer architecture, the shar-
ing of hardware resources between peers eliminates the imminent need for state of the art server
hardware. Consequently, the peer-to-peer architecture immediately increases the reliability and
redundancy of the file distributions. At the same time, it reduces the need of introducing tech-
nologies such as load balancing and failover systems.
The first generation of peer-to-peer architectures origins from 1999 when the Napster soft-
ware revolutionized audio file sharing over the Internet. In this first generation however, the
peer-to-peer architecture was in its infancy, provably containing some rather problematic prop-
erties. While it is true that peers exchanged content between themselves in a decentralized fash-
ion, there was a centralized server entity present as well. This entity primarily coordinated the
establishment of connections between peers. However, it also indexed all of the files in posses-
sion by the participating peers, and let peers execute search queries to locate other peers with
files of interest. Because of this hybrid property of both centralization and decentralization,
Napster ended up with a conviction in the infringement of copyrighted material [1].
After the first generation of peer-to-peer architectures, several improved architectures fol-
lowed in the subsequent years. However, the BitTorrent protocol proposed by Bram Cohen in
2001 got the most attention [6]. This protocol was a very special peer-to-peer protocol, and after
its introduction things seemed to fall into place. The BitTorrent protocol remains the preferred
peer-to-peer protocol even today.
Many people in the public, especially those without background in computer science related
disciplines, today associate the BitTorrent protocol with illegal piracy. While it is true that a lot
of illegal piracy is distributed using the BitTorrent protocol, its use is widespread in almost all
areas where the distribution of large files is necessary. While it makes sense to credit this fact to
the protocol being open source, it is also apparent that the protocol’s capability of performing
at extraordinary levels running on commodity hardware is essential in its success. One of the
primary reasons for its excellent performance is its ability to download from multiple peers si-
multaneously. This means that a single peer’s poor Internet connection will not be a bottleneck
for a file’s transfer rates, but rather that the transfer rates will grow increasingly depending on
how many peers are offering the file.
Since the protocol is open source, anyone who wishes to utilize it in his or her applica-
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Figure 2.3: Clients with different file piece availability
tions may do so free of cost. Since the arrival of the BitTorrent protocol, file distribution has
changed dramatically. The following will elaborate more thoroughly on how the BitTorrent pro-
tocol works and how it is able to outperform the client/server architecture.
How It Works
A file distributed over the BitTorrent protocol is an array of pieces, each piece representing a
small portion of the file. A file piece is typically 256KB in size and the BitTorrent protocol allows
peers to download files piece by piece. If a single peer is in possession of the entire file’s array of
pieces, the terminology of the BitTorrent protocol classifies that peer as a seed. In other words,
a seed is either a peer that is the source of a file, or a peer that has been able to download all
pieces of a file and is still participating in the swarm. In the process of sharing a new file, there
is typically a single seed (the source) initially. Over time, as more and more peers acquire the
complete file, the swarm may contain multiple seeds, i.e. the swarm becomes healthy.
The technique of splitting files into pieces enables peers to acquire an arbitrary amount of
pieces over one download session, before returning in a later download session to continue the
process. This property is very convenient when talking about files of excessive size. Figure 2.3
illustrates the differentiating availability of pieces between 3 participating clients. At this point
in time, Client 3 is classified as the swarm’s seed.
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Figure 2.4: The initial client request to the tracker
To enable peers to find each other in a file distribution, the BitTorrent protocol consists of
an entity called the tracker. The tracker is an application running on a web server responsible
for coordinating the communication between peers. When a peer is interested in a file, it typ-
ically establishes a HTTP connection to the tracker to find out which of the other peers are in
possession of that particular file’s pieces. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4. This connection also
serves the purpose of letting peers inform the tracker of their respective states. The peers send
requests known as announce requests to the tracker continuously at specific time intervals. An-
nounce requests includes letting the tracker know how much a peer has been able to download
so far, how much is remaining, which file pieces is in its possession etc.
Once a peer has established a HTTP connection to the tracker and started sending announce
requests, the peer can use the information provided by the tracker to establish TCP connections
to other peers in the swarm and to begin the file transfer. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Considering the above, like Napster, the BitTorrent protocol contains a centralized entity as
well. However, unlike Napster’s centralized entity, the BitTorrent tracker does not know anything
about the contents of the files it is tracking. The tracker contains a list of all peers in the system,
state information for every peer and knows which of the peers are in possession of a file’s pieces.
Since the file transfer sessions goes on between peers, the bandwidth requirement of the tracker
and its corresponding web server is very low. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the
BitTorrent tracker is arguably the BitTorrent protocol’s foremost weakness. The tracker is a single
point of failure and its potential failure will interrupt the distribution of its tracked files [10].
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Figure 2.5: The relationship between the tracker and its peers
Like in a client/server architecture, the commonly used remedy for this issue is to run multiple
trackers in parallel and to introduce load balancing and failover systems accordingly.
Every file’s distribution in the BitTorrent protocol must have a corresponding meta-info file
called the torrent file. The torrent file has the .torrent extension and typically resides in an ar-
bitrary location on the Internet. Users that are interested in acquiring a file must obtain its
corresponding torrent file. The torrent file contains information about the tracker, to which the
user must connect to be able to locate the file’s peers. In addition to the tracker information,
the torrent file contains various other information, such as the file name, file size, piece length,
hash values for each of the file’s pieces etc. The purpose of the hash values is for the peers to
ensure data integrity [6] at all times. Listing 2.1 shows a simplified illustration of a torrent file.
1 announce : ’ http : / /some . tracker . ur l ’
2 created by : ’ creator ’
3 creation date : 1427187561
4 info {
5 name: ’ picture . jpg ’
6 piece length : 256000
7 pieces : ’ abcd ’ ’ efgh ’ ’ i j k l ’
8 }
Listing 2.1: BitTorrent metadata/torrent file
As illustrated, most of the information in the torrent file that is concerning the underlying
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file resides in a dictionary/map commonly referred to as the info dictionary. When clients/peers
send announce requests (HTTP GET) to the tracker, they include a 20 byte SHA-1 hash value of
the info dictionary appended to the info_hash parameter. This parameter serves as an iden-
tifier for the particular torrent on the tracker. Other parameters include ip, port, downloaded
etc. Listing 2.2 shows an example announce request.
1 " http : / / tracker . ur l : port /announce? info_hash=abcdefg12345&peer_id=1&ip =192.168.1.1
2 &port=6881&downloaded=1234& l e f t =4567&event=stopped"
Listing 2.2: BitTorrent announce request (HTTP GET)
Note that the torrent file illustrated in Listing 2.1 is heavily simplified. In reality, the Bit-
Torrent protocol encodes the torrent files in a relatively uncommon binary format, namely the
Bencode format (pronounced B-encode). This format is a data language that serves for stor-
ing data in a platform independent way. Some might argue that the Bencode format has many
similarities with the XML and JSON formats in that respect. However, the Bencode format is a
binary format and provides some unique properties that neither XML nor JSON has. Specifically,
for every possible value, there is a one to one relationship between the particular plaintext value
and its bencoded value. This property has the advantage of enabling applications to compare
encoded values directly, instead of decoding/re-encoding for every comparison.
Data Type Bencode
hello String 5:hello
6 Integer i6e
{"one", 2, "three"} List l3:onei2e5:threee
{"year", 2015} Dictionary d4:yeari2015ee
Table 2.1: Bencoding Examples
As seen in Table 2.1, all strings in the Bencode format is length prefixed, meaning that to store
the string "hello", it would need to be stored as "5:hello", indicating that it is five characters long.
To store integers, one must prepend a prefix "i" as well as a suffix "e". To store the number "6", it
would need to be stored as "i6e". To encode a list it would need to look like "l<contents>e", while
a dictionary’s encoding would need to look like "d<contents>e". The contents of a dictionary
must appear as alternations between keys and their corresponding value.
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Since the underlying file transfer between peers utilize the TCP protocol, BitTorrent enforces
a pipelining structure to limit the delay between pieces. To clarify, as we already know, files
splits into an array of pieces. However, the BitTorrent protocol actually continues to split a file’s
pieces into even smaller chunks known as sub-pieces [6]. Sub-pieces are typically 16KB in size.
This allows the protocol to keep several requests pending at any given time to increase the per-
formance of the underlying TCP protocol. Every time a sub-piece arrives, a peer sends a new
request.
When sending requests for pieces it is very important to request the pieces in a clever order.
The BitTorrent protocol implements several piece selection algorithms to ensure of this. During
a file’s distribution, the peers continuously report to all of its fellow peers about which pieces it
possesses. Note that a peer will not report about a piece before it has checked its hash value with
the hash value present in the respective torrent file. A bad piece selection algorithm can cause a
peer to be in possession of all the pieces its fellow peers can provide at a given time, resulting in
poor progression. Similarly, it can also cause a peer to be unable to provide its fellow peers with
pieces that they do not already have.
When determining which pieces to request, the BitTorrent protocol enforces the so-called
strict policy. This means that once a peer has obtained a sub-piece of a particular piece, subse-
quent requests will always entail the remaining sub-pieces of that same piece. This will ensure
that peers acquire complete pieces as soon as possible, rather than becoming stuck with a bunch
of sub-pieces unable to offer anything to other peers.
When a peer starts downloading for the first time, it will select a piece to download at ran-
dom. This is because the peer will be unable to upload anything, and the BitTorrent protocol
wants it to acquire a single complete piece as soon as possible, so that it can start contributing
to the file’s distribution. Once a peer has obtained a complete piece, the strategy changes from
random to selecting the rarest pieces first. The rarest first approach increases the chance that a
peer will be in possession of pieces that other peers are missing. By postponing the requests for
more common pieces, it also increases the chance that the peers in possession of the common
pieces will still be offering them later.
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The Download Process
Now that we understand the BitTorrent protocol to some extent, the following will describe the
process of downloading a file, from a regular user’s point of view.
1. Obtain the torrent file containing the metadata about the desired file and open it in any
BitTorrent client. The torrent file may reside anywhere. For instance, the user may browse
the web, stumble upon the torrent and download it through their browser as they would
with any other file.
2. After opening the torrent file in a BitTorrent client, the client will be able to parse the
Bencoded file and to locate the URL of the tracker. The client will subsequently connect
to the tracker.
3. If the BitTorrent client successfully connected to the tracker, the tracker will report in-
formation about the current peers participating in the distribution of the file back to the
client. The client will make corresponding connections to these peers.
4. The client will begin downloading the file’s pieces from the peers to which it is connected.
5. Eventually, the client will have downloaded all the pieces and the entire file will be at the
user’s disposal. At this time, the client can safely leave the swarm, or remain to continue
the contribution of the file’s distribution.
Security Concerns
While the BitTorrent protocol is very convenient and efficient, there are some concerns regard-
ing its security and privacy capabilities. To be fair, the BitTorrent protocol’s design does not in-
volve security or privacy at all, so the fact that it is lacking in these areas is rather obvious. How-
ever, some application areas require some security, and there does exist some ways to achieve
it, at least to some extent. However, introducing security and privacy capabilities to the protocol
means that there will be a performance tradeoff.
The most obvious security concern with the BitTorrent protocol is the HTTP GET requests
happening between the peers and the tracker. These requests are happening in plaintext, and
as such, any eavesdropper is able to see all the traffic going on between peers and the tracker.
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Additionally, the TCP connections established between the peers after they have determined
which of the other peers in the swarm they will request the file’s pieces from, is also completely
open.
To remedy these concerns, it is possible to force the client requests between the peers and
the tracker to convey over a secure channel by using HTTPS (SSL/TLS). However, this means
that both the tracker and the clients must both support this, which is not always the case. Ad-
ditionally, it is possible to force the clients to encrypt the traffic between peers as well, typically
with a stream cipher such as RC4. Again, this is only possible if the respective BitTorrent clients
support this.
Chapter 3
Design and Implementation
The following sections will elaborate on the design and implementation of the thesis sharing
system. It will attempt to answer questions such as what the general idea behind the system is,
what its purpose is and how it differs from other work out there.
3.1 Motivation
The primary motivating factor behind the thesis work is to provide a secure mechanism for shar-
ing files that are stored on the Internet. Many of today’s cloud storage providers (CSPs) are lack-
ing when it comes to protecting their users’ data. A common denominator for several providers
out there is that they appear to invest heavily in making sure their users’ files are stored in a
secure manner. This typically entails that the files are satisfactory encrypted in accordance to
today’s recommendations and standards. However, at the same time several CSPs openly admit
that they are capable of decrypting their users’ files. This relates to the fact that the encryption
algorithms in use are typically symmetric, and the cloud storage providers themselves are in
possession of all the keys. This means that they have complete control of their users’ files and if
required by laws and regulations, are able to provide government representatives with the same
access. Of course, the CSPs claim that only a handful of engineers have the necessary credentials
to access the decryption keys and that the users need not to worry. However, given the incidents
featured in the media in the recent years where private files have ended up in the wrong hands,
such claims might not be sufficient.
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3.2 System Analogy
To some extent, the sharing system leaves the idea of directly sharing files between parties be-
hind. Instead, it introduces a sort of map or location analogy. This analogy becomes possible by
utilizing so-called metadata files, which is part of the BitTorrent protocol domain. When users
share files between themselves using the thesis sharing system, they actually share the meta-
data/location of the files between them instead. In other words, when Alice wants to share a
private file with Bob, she shares the encrypted metadata of the file with Bob instead. This way,
when Bob decrypts the metadata, he can access the file location.
3.3 Design
While it is convenient to think of the thesis sharing system as sharing the location of files be-
tween each other, it is not that simple in practice. To elaborate, when Alice shares the location
of her private file with Bob, she actually shares the private file’s corresponding metadata file,
as ciphertext. The torrent files part of the BitTorrent protocol domain is exactly that, metadata
files. Because of this, the BitTorrent protocol fits like hand in glove for the thesis sharing system.
Upon receiving the encrypted torrent file (metadata), Bob is capable of learning the private file’s
location by decrypting it and examining its contents. Upon decryption, Bob learns the location
of the file by accessing the tracker URL present in the torrent file. From the decrypted torrent
file, Bob is able to obtain the underlying file through an arbitrary BitTorrent client.
In using the thesis sharing system, all interaction must go through a web service API. The
functions exposed by the API is reachable through HTTPS calls and is capable of performing all
the necessary actions to share files between users. An elaboration on exactly how the system
implements this follows later in this chapter.
3.3.1 Framework/System Architecture
To elaborate on the sharing system’s architecture, the following will walk through a sample sce-
nario illustrating how the sharing system can work in practice. Assume that Alice is the pro-
fessor of a cryptography course at a university. Bob and Charlie are both participating in the
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Figure 3.1: All parties generate their respective key pair separately
Figure 3.2: Alice generates a torrent/metadata file for the course syllabus document
cryptography course. Alice wants to be able to share the course syllabus document with all of
her students. Moreover, she wants to achieve this in a secure and convenient manner. As we
shall see, the thesis sharing system will meet this requirement.
To start using the sharing system, all parties need to obtain their own respective key pair,
one secret key and one public key. The process of obtaining key pairs is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Note that the respective calls to KeyGen is in practice two different calls, one call to newSecretKey
with no parameter and one call to newPublicKey with the respective secret key as its parameter.
The figure illustrates this as a single call to a non-existent function KeyGen for simplicity.
To initialize the file sharing process, Alice starts by generating a torrent/metadata file for the
syllabus document by calling the newTorrent API function, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Now that Alice has generated a metadata file for the course syllabus, she uploads the newly
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Figure 3.3: Alice uploads the torrent to the sharing system
Figure 3.4: Alice generates the re-encryption key RK A→C
generated torrent to the sharing system by calling the upload function. Alice supplies her own
public key as one of two parameters to this function. This function call will make the sharing
system generate a unique id (file name) for the torrent before announcing it on its BitTorrent
tracker. Successively, it encrypts the torrent with Alice’s public key and the resulting ciphertext
is stored in a database. Figure 3.3 illustrates this procedure.
To finalize the initialization process, Alice starts seeding the torrent by opening it in a BitTor-
rent client while also making a note of the system generated id.
Upon student inquiry about the course syllabus, Alice generates a re-encryption key with
her own secret key and the student’s public key. For instance, if Charlie is the inquirer, Alice
generates RK A→C . Figure 3.4 shows an illustration of the re-encryption key generation.
In possession of RK A→C , Alice initiates the sharing system’s share function, supplying the
torrent id, Charlie’s public key PKC and the newly generated re-encryption key RK A→C as pa-
rameters. This will let the sharing system know that Alice has granted Charlie access to the
course syllabus torrent. The sharing system will store these publicly available parameters in its
database. Figure 3.5 illustrates this procedure. Note that all this information is public and as
such, storing it as plaintext in the system’s database does not cause security concerns.
Followed by this, Alice must inform Charlie of the torrent’s id. Figure 3.6 illustrates this in a
simple manner. Note that there is no specification on how this should take place. Regardless of
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Figure 3.5: Alice shares the course syllabus torrent with Charlie
Figure 3.6: Alice informs Charlie of the torrent id
how the torrent id travels from Alice to Charlie, the reality is that Charlie is required to know the
torrent id to proceed.
It is also worth noting that Alice must call the share function and generate RK A→X once
for every student to which she wants to share the syllabus. In other words, Alice must repeat
the sharing procedure if she is to delegate syllabus access to Bob or any of the other students
participating in the course later.
In possession of the torrent’s id and a notification from Alice about the newly acquired ac-
cess, Charlie initiates the sharing system’s download function, supplying the torrent id and his
own public key PKC as parameters. Figure 3.7 illustrates this procedure. With these parameters,
the sharing system looks up the torrent matching the parameter given id in its database and
verifies whether there is a record containing Charlie’s public key present. If Alice invoked the
sharing function correctly, this should be the case. If so, there is also a re-encryption key present
in the same record, which the sharing system uses to re-encrypt the torrent ciphertext before
returning it to Charlie.
In possession of the new ciphertext, Charlie is capable of decryption with his own secret key.
Upon decryption, the torrent/metadata file is in the hands of Charlie. At this point, Charlie can
open the torrent in a BitTorrent client and obtain the course syllabus. Figure 3.8 illustrates the
decryption call.
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Figure 3.7: Charlie downloads the torrent file (ciphertext)
Figure 3.8: Charlie decrypts the torrent file (ciphertext)
If we compare the above procedure to many of today’s sharing practices, one major differ-
ence comes to mind. When relying on third parties to re-encrypt content in more traditional
public key cryptosystems, said third party must be fully trusted. This is because it is necessary
to decrypt ciphertext into plaintext before re-encrypting it to new ciphertext compatible with
another key. Because of the strength of the proxy re-encryption primitive, this is not the case in
the above scenario. Alice, Bob and Charlie are all depending on the sharing system as a third
party proxy instance. However, the sharing system only interacts with publicly available infor-
mation/keys, and thus need not be trusted. Some sensitive information does travel between
entities. However, this is protected by the HTTPS protocol.
3.4 Implementation
The implementation of the thesis sharing system consists of multiple components. The primary
components are as follows, all of whose respective implementations are separate projects in the
underlying source code workspace.
• Common
• Cryptography
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• BitTorrent
• Sharing System
• Web Service
These five projects have dependencies between themselves. All projects have a reference to
the common project, which mostly consist of static variables such as the path to different files
and directories in use by several different parts of the system.
Throughout the development, the source code management took place with use of Git [27]
as a version control system. The purpose of version control systems is primarily to help manage
source code changes between several developers working on the same source code. There are
many different version control systems available out there. Git differs from many of them in that
it is decentralized, meaning that developers have their own copies of the repository on their own
machines, instead of accessing the repository directly on a single server placed on a centralized
location.
During the thesis development, the Git repository was set up as a GitHub [28] private repos-
itory. GitHub is a web-based hosting service for Git repositories. Private repositories are repos-
itories that only people with the appropriate credentials can access and requires a small sub-
scription fee. On the other hand, public repositories are available to anyone browsing the web.
Given that only one developer worked on the thesis, GitHub primarily functioned as a graphical
user interface for browsing past source code changes as well as a backup tool. By committing
source code changes to the local repository first, before pushing these changes to a remote loca-
tion (GitHub), backup capabilities became a side effect of using Git as a version control system.
At the time of submission, the Git repository consists of 139 different commits where 90.2% is
Java code, 5.5% is HTML and 4.3% is JavaScript (See Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.9: GitHub Repository Language Distribution
These numbers are representing new code exclusively, meaning no modified code is in-
cluded here.
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Note that most source code present in the five projects is Java code. Moreover, all projects
are Maven [18] projects and thereby follow Maven-like practices. Maven is part of the Apache
Software Foundation and is a project management tool. An essential part of Maven projects
is that they all contain their own Project Object Model (POM) file. The POM file is an xml file
that contains information about the project’s configuration, dependencies and more. In other
words, the dependency configuration between the five projects reside in the respective project’s
pom.xml.
Project Name Description
common Static functions and variables used by the other projects
crypto Implements the AFGH proxy re-encryption scheme
bit-torrent All BitTorrent related functionality
secure-share Implements the thesis sharing system
web-service Exposes the thesis sharing system as a web service API
Table 3.1: Implementation Overview - Project Descriptions
Project Name Package Dependencies
common no.uis.msalte.thesis.common.* -
crypto no.uis.msalte.thesis.crypto.* common
bit-torrent no.uis.msalte.thesis.bit_torrent.* common
secure-share no.uis.msalte.thesis.secure_share.* common, crypto, bit-torrent
web-service no.uis.msalte.thesis.web_service.* common, secure-share
Table 3.2: Implementation Overview - Packages and Dependencies
The source code of all projects obviously reside inside their own unique Java packages, but
they all utilize a common package prefix no.uis.msalte.thesis.*. For instance, the common
project resides in no.uis.msalte.thesis.common.*. Table 3.1 shows an overview of the re-
spective project’s descriptions while Table 3.2 shows an overview of the project’s packages and
dependencies. The web-service project is in bold because it represents the sharing system’s
entry point.
3.4.1 Cryptography
The cryptography project resides in no.uis.msalte.thesis.crypto.* and implements the
AFGH proxy re-encryption scheme. As mentioned previously in the paper, such schemes are
CHAPTER 3. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 41
a recent addition to the crypto world. Proxy re-encryption schemes are asymmetric cryptosys-
tems with several convenient properties for a sharing system. The primary benefit is its ca-
pability of delegating decryption rights to ciphertexts to additional parties without the neces-
sity to access the plaintext first. As mentioned previously in the paper, the AFGH proxy re-
encryption scheme bases upon the ElGamal cryptosystem as well as pairing based cryptogra-
phy, also known as bilinear maps. The implementation residing in this project uses a third party
library for generating the bilinear maps and other scheme parameters, namely the Java Pairing
Based Cryptography (JPBC 2.0.0) library [4]. This library is a Java port of the C library pub-
lished as Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC). Ben Lynn, the author of “On the Implementation
of Pairing-Based Cryptosystems” [9], is the primary developer behind the PBC library.
1 public interface ProxyReEncryptionScheme {
2 public String newSecretKey ( ) ;
3 public String newPublicKey ( Str ing secretKey ) ;
4 public String newReEncryptionKey ( Str ing srcSecretKey , Str ing destPublicKey ) ;
5 public String encrypt ( Str ing message , Str ing destPublicKey ) ;
6 public String decrypt ( Str ing cipher , Str ing destSecretKey ) ;
7 public String reEncrypt ( Str ing cipher , Str ing reEncryptionKey ) ;
8 public String encryptReEncryptable ( Str ing message , Str ing destPublicKey ) ;
9 public String decryptReEncryptable ( Str ing cipher , Str ing destSecretKey ) ;
10 }
Listing 3.1: AFGH PRE Interface - ProxyReEncryptionScheme.java
This portion of the thesis sharing system, in addition to its general design, is arguably in
highest regard when it comes to novelty work. The authors of the AFGH proxy re-encryption
scheme has implemented their algorithms in a C++ library known as the JHU-MIT Proxy Re-
cryptography Library [33]. There appears to be an attempted Java implementation of AFGH out
there as well [31], but it seems incomplete and abandoned [32]. Consequently, and since the
thesis sharing system is primarily Java-based, it seemed like a good idea to include a complete
implementation of the AFGH scheme as part of the thesis work. It also seemed very reward-
ing academically as it would ensure a correct understanding of the algorithm. Moreover, it also
seemed beneficial in regards to compatibility and lack of additional overhead caused by refer-
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encing a C++ library from Java source code.
Listing 3.1 shows a Java interface that defines the primary methods implemented in this
project. As shown, all methods operate on String parameters. This is primarily for conve-
nience and compatibility. In practice, unless these strings represent plaintext, they are Base64
encoded. Base64 is an encoding format that encodes binary data to textual data, which is very
convenient in this case. The underlying implementations convert the String objects to more
specific objects before performing the mathematical operations on them etc. To elaborate, the
objects on which the crypto project operates are primarily part of the JPBC library, specifically
in the it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc package. To mention some of the most important ones, the
Field interface represents a generic algebraic structure. The Pairing interface gives access to
common pairing functions. Finally, the Element interface represents an element of a group or a
field.
In the crypto project’s source code, the class no.uis.msalte.thesis.crypto.scheme.
ProxyReEncryptionParams is responsible for generating the parameters for the AFGH scheme.
Moreover, no.uis.msalte.thesis.crypto.scheme.ProxyReEncryptionSchemeImpl imple-
ments the interface in Listing 3.1. The ProxyReEncryptionSchemeImpl class instantiates the
ProxyReEncryptionParams class in its constructor.
3.4.2 BitTorrent
The BitTorrent projects resides in no.uis.msalte.thesis.bit_torrent.* and primarily pro-
vide the sharing system with a custom BitTorrent tracker implementation. The project is highly
dependent upon a modified version of a library known as ttorrent [19]. The ttorrent library is an
open-source implementation of the BitTorrent protocol written in Java. Because of this work’s
necessity for increased security capabilities, significant modifications to this project was imper-
ative. Note that the ttorrent library is licensed under the Apache Software License version 2.0.
The modifications to ttorrent includes the enforcement of SSL/TLS on all HTTP requests
made to the tracker. This enforcement is the result of a javax.net.ssl.SSLContext instance.
The SSLContext object builds from a certificate generated by the Java keytool feature [35].
The keytool result is a Java KeyStore file (.jks), which functions as a repository of SSL/TLS cer-
tificates. In possession of the generated Java KeyStore, the source code builds the SSLContext
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Figure 3.10: Vuze Client Encryption Options
object and the server is capable of providing secure connections.
Additionally, the tracker will abandon all clients that does not implement encryption be-
tween themselves and other peers. Most of today’s popular BitTorrent clients have the capability
of enabling the RC4 stream cipher for communication with other peers. However, most clients
disable this option by default. In other words, users of the modified tracker must enable the
encryption option manually.
To elaborate on this behavior, the tracker expects incoming announce requests to include
an additional parameter requirescrypto=1 to let it know that a client is indeed capable of
encryption. If clients query the tracker without this parameter in the HTTP GET request, the
tracker will abandon the request and return a HTTP 406 error message, meaning that the request
was unacceptable.
The requirescryptoflag is part of a tracker extension specification provided by the Azureus
(now Vuze) MSE (Message Stream Encryption) documentation. Because of this, many BitTorrent
clients are not providing this flag even though they are capable of encryption. However, popular
clients such as Vuze and Transmission does supply this flag in their requests when enabling
encryption. Figure 3.10 shows the encryption options available in the Vuze client.
To summarize, the modifications to the BitTorrent tracker makes the thesis sharing system
discriminate slightly on BitTorrent clients. Only clients supplying the requirescrypto flag in
their HTTP GET requests is accepted. While this property is an obvious weakness, it was de-
cidedly better to support only a handful of the most popular clients than it would have been to
support none of them. The alternative would involve developing a new BitTorrent client as part
of the thesis, but this would significantly reduce the sharing system’s appeal.
In addition to providing the sharing system with a customized BitTorrent tracker, this project
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also provides the sharing system with torrent generation functionality. In other words, by sup-
plying the static function BitTorrentUtils.createBase64() with an arbitrary file such as a
document or a picture, it will return a Bencoded torrent/metadata file as a Base64 encoded
String object. In addition to default behavior, this function will append two additional fields
to the torrent’s info dictionary. The first field is the private=1 field, which is an optional field
part of the BitTorrent protocol. The private field serves the purpose of preventing clients from
sharing torrents with clients that does not have access to the tracker. In other words, clients will
only announce to the tracker and not between themselves.
The second field appended to the torrent’s info dictionary is a custom field
atoken=<random unique value>. This field contains a randomly generated universally unique
identifier (UUID) and serves the purpose of forcing the torrent’s info hash to change. This is to
ensure that it is impossible to reverse engineer the torrent by looking at server logs. The sharing
system’s other BitTorrent functionality never access the atoken field and thus its only purpose
is obfuscation. The curious reader might wonder why the field’s name is "atoken" instead of
"token". The answer is that a torrent’s info dictionary always appear alphabetically sorted and
that the info hash is a 20 byte SHA-1 value. By ensuring that the field occurs in the beginning of
the dictionary, one can be certain that the field is included in the first 20 bytes and thus affects
the resulting hash value.
3.4.3 Sharing System
The sharing system project resides in no.uis.msalte.thesis.secure_share and implements
the sharing logic itself. As illustrated in Table 3.2, this project is dependent upon the common,
bit-torrent and crypto projects. Through its dependencies, this project implements the complete
sharing system. With a reference to this project as a library/dependency, the complete thesis
sharing system’s implementation is available to other projects.
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1 public interface SecureShare {
2 public String newTorrent ( F i l e f i l e ) ;
3 public String decrypt ( Str ing ciphertext , Str ing secretKey ) ;
4 public String newSecretKey ( ) ;
5 public String newPublicKey ( Str ing secretKey ) ;
6 public String newReEncryptionKey ( Str ing srcSecretKey , Str ing destPublicKey ) ;
7 public String upload ( F i l e f i l e , Str ing publicKey ) ;
8 public boolean share ( Str ing fileName , Str ing publicKey , Str ing reEncryptionKey ) ;
9 public String download ( Str ing fileName , Str ing publicKey ) ;
10 public String announce ( F i l e f i l e ) ;
11 }
Listing 3.2: Sharing System Interface - SecureShare.java
Listing 3.2 shows a Java interface that defines the primary methods exposed by this project.
As shown, this interface defines methods primarily for sharing functionality, but also for key
generation in the referenced cryptography scheme.
The sharing system project implements a simple and lightweight database layer that is re-
sponsible for storing information about existing share operations. The implementation of the
database/persistence layer is specifically two key-value stores (NoSQL databases), one for active
share relationships known as shares and one for encrypted torrent content known as torrents.
The database layer runs on the MapDB database engine [20], which is an in-memory database
engine with high focus on performance and simplicity. In-memory databases load the complete
database into memory during runtime and makes backups of the database as a dump file on the
file system on application exit. This behavior ensures exceptional performance and removes the
necessity of a database server instance, such as the case is with the more traditional relational
databases.
Key Value
545c728b-cef4-44d7-b261-6690bf3b07ce.torrent hkSQsuAlgas7yhrlATMo5bSChPD8PsWidLefGlQlC67D6H...
66b297b6-ff8a-447a-b365-831edc76c427.torrent A6aZ1CQgulpJ+WTrQTuUABl2oYtj8ISAKtX4Hb53xPLez...
Table 3.3: Persistence Layer - Torrents
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As shown in Table 3.3, the torrents database is a key-value store/map of file names and
encrypted file content. This particular example contains two records/keys. The sharing sys-
tem generates the torrent file names upon torrent generation as a universally unique identifier
(UUID). This ensures that it is impossible for two torrents to have the same name/id in the sys-
tem. Because the file names function as the key field in the database map, the guarantee of
unique file names is a necessity.
Key Value
545c728b-cef4-44d7-b261-6690bf3b07ce.torrent
[{"publicKey":"pk1","reEncryptionKey":"rk1"},
{"publicKey":"pk2","reEncryptionKey":"rk2"},
{"publicKey":"pk3","reEncryptionKey":"rk3"}]
Table 3.4: Persistence Layer - Shares
Similarly, as shown in Table 3.4, the shares database is a key-value store/map of file names
and a corresponding JSON object. JSON stands for JavaScript Object Notation and derive from
the syntax used for representing objects in the JavaScript language. The JSON object functioning
as the database map’s value field is an array of key tuples. Every key tuple contains a public
key and a corresponding re-encryption key. The array of key tuples functions as the sharing
system’s access control system for every torrent file. From the data stored in the shares database,
the sharing system is able to validate access to stored torrents upon user inquiry. If the user
supplies the sharing system with a file name and its own public key, the sharing system can
look up the file name in the shares database and subsequently determine whether the supplied
public key exists in the corresponding JSON object. If both these tests are successful, the sharing
system can determine that the user has valid access to the torrent file. From this, the sharing
system looks up the corresponding re-encryption key in the respective JSON object and uses
it to re-encrypt the encrypted content stored in the torrents database under the same key (file
name). The result is new ciphertext representing the user inquired torrent. The user is capable
of recovering the plaintext/torrent with his secret key upon download.
In the source code, all database actions are reachable from the Persist.java singleton
class. As with all classes implementing the singleton pattern, one does not create a new in-
stance of the class through its constructor, rather by calling its static Persist.getInstance()
method. To enforce this, a singleton class typically defines its constructor with the private mod-
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ifier, meaning it will not be visible outside its own class. Using the singleton pattern for the
Persist class ensures that the application is limited to a single static reference to the persis-
tence layer, meaning that conflicting database operations will not occur.
3.4.4 Web Service (System Entry Point)
The web service project resides in no.uis.msalte.thesis.web_service.* and implements
the user interface of the sharing system. This project serves as the entry point of the entire shar-
ing system, as it exposes an API through the HTTP protocol. By calling the functions exposed by
the web service API, it is possible to incorporate the entire thesis sharing system into existing ap-
plications. As with the sharing system’s embedded BitTorrent tracker, the web server providing
the web service API also enforce its HTTP requests to go over SSL/TLS.
The web service runs on a framework known as Spark [21], which is a lightweight Java-based
web application framework. By default, the Spark framework runs on an embedded web server
on top of Jetty [22]. The primary reason for choosing the Spark framework was its simplistic
approach and almost absent necessity for configuration. When using Maven, specifying the
Spark framework as a dependency in the project’s pom.xml was sufficient configuration. From
this point, exposing the sharing system API through both HTTP GET and HTTP POST functions
was very easy.
1 import s t a t i c spark . Spark . * ;
2 public class HelloWorld {
3 public s t a t i c void main( Str ing [ ] args ) {
4 get ( " / get_hel lo " , ( req , res ) −> "GET: Hello World" ) ;
5 post ( " / post_hello " , ( req , res ) −> "POST: Hello World" ) ;
6 }
7 }
Listing 3.3: Simple Spark Framework Example
Listing 3.3 shows a simple example of a Spark web service. On line 4 we can see the spec-
ification on how the web server should react to a HTTP GET request on the /get_hello path.
The second parameter to this function is a so-called lambda expression, which is a recent intro-
CHAPTER 3. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 48
duction to Java, specifically to Java 8. This particular lambda expression returns a simple string
GET: Hello World. Similarly, on line 5 we can see a specification on how the web server
should request to a HTTP POST request on the /post_hello path. To enable HTTPS on Spark’s
default Jetty web server, it is necessary to call Spark.secure() and supply a Java KeyStore file as
one of the parameters. Amazingly enough, the code snippet in Listing 3.3 is all that is required to
run a simple web service on the Spark framework. However, to support the functionality present
in the thesis implementation the required code is necessarily slightly more complex. The basic
idea is still the same.
API Path Description
/api Returns an overview of the API
/newSecretKey Generates a new secret key in the underlying PRE scheme
/newTorrent Generates a new torrent file from a parameter given file
/upload Uploads a parameter given torrent file and encrypts it before storing it
/newPublicKey Generates a new public key in the underlying PRE scheme
/newReEncryptionKey Generates a new re-encryption key in the underlying PRE scheme
/decrypt Decrypts the parameter given ciphertext
/share Shares a parameter given torrnet file with another user
/download Downloads a torrent file matching the parameter given file name
/announce Manually announces a torrent file on the system’s tracker
Table 3.5: Web Service API Description
API Path Implementation Extends Method
/api ApiGetRoute.java WebServiceRoute GET
/newSecretKey NewSecretKeyGetRoute.java WebServiceRoute GET
/newTorrent NewTorrentPostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
/upload UploadPostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
/newPublicKey NewPublicKeyPostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
/newReEncryptionKey NewReEncryptionKeyPostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
/decrypt DecryptPostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
/share SharePostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
/download DownloadPostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
/announce AnnouncePostRoute.java WebServiceRoute POST
Table 3.6: Web Service API Implementation
In the thesis source code, the class no.uis.msalte.thesis.web_service.server.Server
is responsible for setting up the Spark web service. Moreover, all the API functions have their
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own separate class in the no.uis.msalte.thesis.web_service.routespackage. These classes
all extend the abstract class no.uis.msalte.thesis.web_service.routes.WebServiceRoute,
which in turn extends the Spark framework abstract class known spark.RouteImpl. This class
provides its descendants with constant variables as well as some code that is common for all
routes (See Listing 3.4). The primary purpose of the RouteImpl class is its path variable and
its declaration of the handle() method. Because WebServiceRoute extends RouteImpl, that
class must reflect these properties as well. The Spark framework uses the path variable for URL
matching of incoming requests while also making sure that any request matching its respective
path variable is handled by the correct and corresponding handle() method. As illustrated in
Listing 3.4, the handle() method contains approximately ten lines of code. This code is com-
mon for all routes, and make up the basis upon which the specific route implementations build.
To clarify, the descendants of WebServiceRoute start their own respective handle() implemen-
tations by calling super.handle() to fetch the initial state to which they make modifications.
Table 3.5 shows an overview of the functions exposed by the web service API. Moreover, Ta-
ble 3.6 shows an overview of the classes responsible for handling the different HTTP requests,
in other words the classes that extend the WebServiceRoute abstract class. Finally, Table 3.7
shows an overview of the parameters, arguments and return values in respect to each of the
API functions. Note that the web service treats all HTTP POST requests as multipart/form-data,
which is an encoding method used by HTML forms consisting of the “file” input type element.
1 public abstract class WebServiceRoute extends RouteImpl {
2
3 public s t a t i c f i n a l String PARAM_FILE = " f i l e " ;
4 public s t a t i c f i n a l String PARAM_SECRET_KEY = " secretKey " ;
5 public s t a t i c f i n a l String PARAM_PUBLIC_KEY = " publicKey " ;
6 public s t a t i c f i n a l String PARAM_FILE_NAME = "fileName" ;
7 public s t a t i c f i n a l String PARAM_RE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = " reEncryptionKey " ;
8 public s t a t i c f i n a l String PARAM_CIPHERTEXT = " ciphertext " ;
9
10 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_API = " api " ;
11 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_DECRYPT = " decrypt " ;
12 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_NEW_TORRENT = "newTorrent" ;
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13 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_NEW_SECRET_KEY = "newSecretKey" ;
14 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_NEW_PUBLIC_KEY = "newPublicKey" ;
15 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_NEW_RE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "newReEncryptionKey" ;
16 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_SHARE = " share " ;
17 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_UPLOAD = "upload" ;
18 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_DOWNLOAD = "download" ;
19 public s t a t i c f i n a l String FUNC_ANNOUNCE = "announce" ;
20
21 private boolean isPostRoute ;
22
23 public WebServiceRoute ( Str ing path , boolean isPostRoute ) {
24 super ( path ) ;
25
26 t h i s . isPostRoute = isPostRoute ;
27 }
28
29 @Override
30 public Object handle ( Request request , Response response ) throws Exception {
31 f i n a l WebServiceResponse r = new WebServiceResponse ( ) ;
32
33 // by default , t r e a t as BAD_REQUEST
34 r . setStatus ( HttpURLConnection .HTTP_BAD_REQUEST ) ;
35 r . setMessage ( " Inval id parameter ( s ) " ) ;
36 r . setContent ( null ) ;
37
38 i f ( isPostRoute ) {
39 // t r e a t i n g a l l post requests as multipart /form−data
40 request . raw ( ) . s e t A t t r i b u t e ( " org . ecl ipse . multipartConfig " ,
41 WebServiceUtils .MULTIPART_CONFIG ) ;
42 }
43
44 return r ;
45 }
46 }
Listing 3.4: Abstract Class for a Web Service Route - WebServiceRoute.java
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API Path Parameters Arguments Returns
/api - - List
/newSecretKey - - Base64
/newTorrent file Binary Base64
/upload file, publicKey Binary, Base64 String
/newPublicKey secretKey Base64 Base64
/newReEncryptionKey secretKey, publicKey Base64, Base64 Base64
/decrypt ciphertext, secretKey Base64, Base64 String
/share fileName, publicKey, reEncryptionKey String, Base64, Base64 Boolean
/download fileName, publicKey String, Base64 Base64
/announce file Binary String
Table 3.7: Web Service API Parameters, Arguments and Return Values
All the API functions return a JSON formatted result, more specifically a JSON represen-
tation of a no.uis.msalte.thesis.web_service.model.WebServiceResponse object. It is
very common for web service APIs to return JSON because of its platform independency and
relative human readability.
Sample JavaScript Client
The web service project contains a sample JavaScript client. This client is available at https://
hostname:port/jsclient.htmlwhile the web service is running. This client uses the JavaScript
framework known as AngularJS and is built exclusively on top of the JSON object returned by the
web service function /api. In addition to AngularJS, the client uses HTML together with cascad-
ing style sheets (CSS) and JavaScript provided by the Bootstrap framework [26].
To see an example of the JavaScript client, see Figure 3.11. To elaborate, the figure shows
an example of the JavaScript client when the selected function is “newPublicKey”. At the top of
the page, there is a dropdown menu for selecting the appropriate API function to test. For any
selected function, the client will responsively produce an overview of the particular function’s
details. Such details are parameters, arguments, return values and more. Moreover, the client
also produces a simple HTML form for testing the function. Finally, upon entering valid data
to said HTML form and pressing the submit button, the client will responsively produce the
function’s result as a JSON object. In the top-right corner of the page, there is a conversion
function capable of converting a Base64 encoded string to a torrent file.
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Figure 3.11: JavaScript Client - Selected Function: newPublicKey
Again, understanding that the JavaScript client is exclusively built on top of the JSON object
returned by the /api function is essential (See Listing 4.2). Moreover, it is paramount to un-
derstand that the intention of the JavaScript client is not to function as a primary client for the
thesis sharing system, but only as a tool for illustration/testing purposes. While the respective
Java projects in the sharing system’s implementation contain their own unit tests to make sure
everything is working as intended, the JavaScript client introduces another dimension of test-
ing with more focus on visibility. By providing a JavaScript client such as illustrated, it becomes
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easier to show people outside the computer science domain that the sharing system is indeed
working as intended.
Chapter 4
Experimental Results
The following sections will demonstrate the use of the thesis sharing system to verify that it is
working as intended. While the sharing system consists of multiple components, it makes the
most sense to divide the testing into two primary categories, namely the cryptography tests and
the web service tests. In the case of the cryptography testing, it makes sense because it is such an
essential part of the sharing system. If any crypto parts are incorrect, the entire sharing system
is incorrect. On the other hand, by testing the web service, which is the primary entry point
for the sharing system, all components of the sharing system is consequently tested. This is
because the web service is dependent upon all the other components to work properly.
4.1 Cryptography Tests
The following will test the functionality related to the cryptography part of the thesis sharing
system. In other words, these tests’ intention is to make sure that the implementation of the
AFGH proxy re-encryption scheme is correct.
To reiterate from the previous chapter, Listing 3.1 shows an overview of the primary methods
implemented in the cryptography project. It makes sense to divide the cryptography tests into
three groups, namely key generation, encryption/re-encryption and decryption.
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 55
4.1.1 Key Generation
There are three different key generation functions; newSecretKey(), newPublicKey() and
newReEncryptionKey(). The secret key generation function takes no parameters. This is the
entry point of the key generation process. To elaborate, both the public key generation function
and the re-encryption key generation function takes a secret key parameter. This means that ev-
ery user will need to generate a secret key before they can proceed to generate any of the other
two key types. The public key generation function generates a public key corresponding to the
parameter given secret key. This is similar to how traditional asymmetric cryptosystems work.
However, the re-encryption key generation differs slightly; it takes the source secret key and the
destination public key as its parameters. This makes sense in that its purpose is to re-encrypt
ciphertext that originally resulted from encryption with the source’s public key.
SK A
M0Aef3i5CCubSLJp5ed5lnzR+vY=
SKB
D7rQ4RZbdLOn9LKLy73CIBqKwkY=
The above shows examples of secret keys generated by the AFGH algorithm. As shown, these
are rather short strings encoded in the Base64 format. By using SK A and SKB respectively as
arguments to the public key generation function, it produces the following two corresponding
public keys.
PK A
e20WEYxKEN+NfJaDmTr0cwub4m85jpWmqOBgJfk9avme9XD5i7TFsho6o5flLbTODKKRdSQuLKI6g
OLHyzAuwX0JqcEH60FqclyU6jHTaN6IvMCMeHyK5xbRc0as8lrOA0tdGTrW6CeLmL+UGdVtFfHRmL
wfIG8iwZl2uBkuW08=
PKB
WJtMhYXIzH+H41xXyPtsXrD/Vr31HXvztvklZTXTP2b/eLTCeFUYe45D/j5SP1/KDz1IWFUFUrzIj
WzWhbWzkSf33LDm5pfgWFmroYpWIiEJAvSnzTn6PM9krppp4uW/eTw20fxW4aYoc2O6nFeRLsw+oS
cy/AkonefeDtUvOsk=
These are also Base64 encoded strings, but as shown, they are rather long. By using SK A
and PKB as arguments to the re-encryption key generation function, it produces the following
re-encryption key.
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RK A→B
XbQn4Dy0V0EIgkpkHjvLXE9LHPVpNS+myL86VoIT8Gw/03Yj9zCcGJTO3XWQzul4aFg+itv6iwLbP
uN4Tz5dZaWGNTBVGUt8X2ecsBEk4QbhnzvVC0KKV7pCm2+CZADuIUogzL+KsqIEuvpzIuXIPv8Qyj
HfF0wYx0y3Mx6wGls=
Again, this is a rather long Base64 encoded string. This encoding enables the system to work
with strings exclusively, without having to depend on more particular parameter types. When
all parameters are of the String type, compatibility across different projects and platforms is a
fact.
4.1.2 Encryption/Re-Encryption
When it comes to encryption/re-encryption capabilities, there are three different functions.
These are encrypt(), encryptReEncryptable() and reEncrypt(). In Chapter 2, when in-
troducing the AFGH scheme, it was illustrated how there are two different levels of encryption
present in the scheme. Messages encrypted in the first level resembles more traditional asym-
metric encryption in that it is only possible to decrypt the ciphertext if in possession of the secret
key corresponding to the public key used during encryption. The encrypt() function encrypts
a message in the first level.
Messages encrypted in the second level, by the encryptReEncryptable() function, is slightly
different. Second level ciphertexts supports re-encryption into first level ciphertexts. In other
words, while it is possible to decrypt second level ciphertexts as is by the source’s secret key,
it is also possible to re-encrypt it into a first level ciphertext, which supports decryption by an
arbitrary destination’s secret key. The reEncrypt() function is capable of re-encryption, i.e.
converting a second level ciphertext for Alice into a first level ciphertext for Bob. In practice,
a proxy instance typically perform the re-encryption operation after user interaction, but the
proxy instance has no means to reveal the underlying plaintext in the process. As mentioned
several times in the paper by now, this is the genius of proxy re-encryption.
Note that when the following text references the keys SK A, SKB , PK A, PKB and RK A→B , these
are in fact references to the keys generated in the previous section on key generation.
M
Meet me at the docks at 5 PM
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The above shows an example message M that Alice wants to keep encrypted somewhere on
the Internet. Alice may choose two different ways of encrypting the message, depending on
whether she wants to share the message with someone else down the line. If Alice wants to keep
the message for herself, first level encryption will suffice. However, if Alice wants to share the
message with others through a proxy instance, second level encryption is required. The latter
choice makes more sense when examining the message contents.
C A1
h0fOdw77InT42YtSjyk9BxOhztbp4WrQR8SiNiAA880rXqu9RYI7bb05bD1RFUf2jDiwgOOBnuw74
DYQ0WoZdQKXY7QPDJmpXLJ6mhMJWwjK5rEKWWXUChQ5jUxXRjHsSpYun2XKyWL4ye19zyZcSTz1om
jaPewk5VQbCRRsq/hsxdXeHTyiTXgExQJMyg9pi3YgIAGrp7LU0NDBmp/aB+iaOQdeVVXvjd4A83A
C8IgYYn9qU/zo38qVd38g94CYRirWYwUvkbg1U3P/7BW/dgJefAWGgy9HIDqnuo5xWBAKPPTov2JB
HNeUefopI/2xWfZrzvXul1VZ42jPZA5qgA==
The above shows the first level ciphertext that results from inputting the message M and
PK A into the encrypt() function. On the other hand, the second level ciphertext resulting from
inputting the same two parameters into the encryptReEncryptable() function follows below.
C A2
opX5TBoVfU4LbaHeqDwixSObGn359t5Un7ezDwR2jl3gJArm82/Wy+GPqnrxVzsBs7JVtCTHgRoLd
PIp3i64eTSaIdu0/XVIa2Fz5EaC6gbGRL/MsLVAEjSVG4oP3XlUPClmLZnnKo76nQTpdUOlFh1ARy
2w/JCfos60t+1pP4qCtT77a4tHacKRh8WpmpdASItLrcf/Dn/88Ukp07T/wL44Axf9uhCLwTyt+wU
3fqVGlRXZu3/oOwUPqVEKxU/KoxTllbOV8F52DkwevZ/XvJs7K1byQc+Xb5TdhdR8wKYvUxoX+ooL
NxrJsQXGRh6Ujel51vdGborib8PTOYtjIQ==
At this point, only Alice is able to decrypt the ciphertexts with her own secret key. However,
a proxy instance may now input C A2 and the re-encryption key RK A→B into the reEncrypt()
function and arrive at an entirely new ciphertext as shown below.
CB1
opX5TBoVfU4LbaHeqDwixSObGn359t5Un7ezDwR2jl3gJArm82/Wy+GPqnrxVzsBs7JVtCTHgRoLd
PIp3i64eTSaIdu0/XVIa2Fz5EaC6gbGRL/MsLVAEjSVG4oP3XlUPClmLZnnKo76nQTpdUOlFh1ARy
2w/JCfos60t+1pP4ojrwDHY1pUJTuuRJCIylZVP1aLemdE+DFuq+xPik6JdKoR+G1wqWYGzfIBKK3
iwe/WaRqb/FzZXrWlaoRYhlHKMvcHAVqmdyMn6s0gHNu0jSS3S1fyQ1YK8/nt46j+KNK/i/x0mIDc
Xs8IzFgUsyQwAmzRVJZaWpw0j/TgPUUbJA==
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Note that the new ciphertext is actually a first level ciphertext now, transformed from a sec-
ond level ciphertext. In the hands of Bob and his secret key, this ciphertext will reveal the mes-
sage to him upon decryption. A proof of this follows in the next section. It is essential to note
that the re-encryption key used by the proxy instance origins from Alice. In other words, the
proxy instance is not able to delegate decryption rights without the necessary re-encryption key
that origins from the original message source.
4.1.3 Decryption
In the scheme’s decryption category, there are two different functions. These are decrypt() and
decryptReEncryptable(). The decrypt() function is capable of decrypting first level cipher-
texts while the decryptReEncryptable() is capable of decrypting second level ciphertexts.
From the previous section, we have three different ciphertexts C A1, C A2 and CB1. As indi-
cated, two of these ciphertexts are first level ciphertexts while one is a second level ciphertext. If
everything is working as intended and in accordance to the AFGH proxy re-encryption scheme,
it should be possible for Alice to decrypt ciphertexts C A1 and C A2 with her secret key SK A. More-
over, Bob should simultaneously be able to decrypt CB1 with his secret key SKB .
The following shows the result when inputting C A1 and SK A into the decrypt() function. If
successful, the result should be human readable plaintext.
P A1 =M
Meet me at the docks at 5 PM
As shown, the decryption reveals the plaintext and the message is "Meet me at the docks at 5
PM". Now that Alice’s first level decryption was successful, it is time to attempt decryption when
inputting C A2 and SK A into the decryptReEncryptable() function. The result follows below.
P A2 =M
Meet me at the docks at 5 PM
As shown, the decryption reveals the plaintext again, and the message is still the same. Now
that Alice’s second level decryption was successful, it is time for Bob to attempt decryption of
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Figure 4.1: Decryption output when supplying incorrect secret key
the re-encrypted ciphertext. In other words, what happens when inputting CB1 and SKB into
the decrypt() function. The result follows below.
PB1 =M
Meet me at the docks at 5 PM
Again, the decryption is successful and the decryption reveals the plaintext to Bob. For
completeness’ sake, Figure 4.1 shows the decryption output when inputting CB1 and SKC =
ckRPohDmX2BHDn/bQ4USK0ZtsXE= into the decrypt() function.
As shown, the decryption did not work with the incorrect decryption key. From this, it is
safe to assume that the AFGH proxy re-encryption implementation is correct. Please note that
while the above tests applies to a very short message, the implementation is in fact applicable
to arbitrary length messages, including file content.
4.2 Web Service Tests
The following will test the web service API, more specifically make sure that all the functions
exposed by the web service is working as intended. Note that the underlying implementations
of these functions are dependent upon the entire thesis sharing system’s components. Because
of this, the following tests will not only test the web service itself, but also all of its referenced
components.
The web service tests will be performed in a per function manner, meaning that every func-
tion exposed by the web service API will be tested separately. As explained in Chapter 3, all
web service functions return a JSON representation of a WebServiceResponse object. Listing
4.1 shows the skeleton of the WebServiceResponse class. The status variable will represent a
HTTP status code while the message variable will contain a short message describing the out-
come of the function call. Finally, the content variable will contain the result of the function
call, and does not belong to a particular datatype or class.
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1 public class WebServiceResponse {
2 private int status ;
3 private String message ;
4 private Object content ;
5 }
Listing 4.1: WebServiceResponse.java
It makes sense to divide the API functions into two groups, namely HTTP GET functions and
HTTP POST functions. The functions exposed as HTTP GET functions are those that take no
parameters. On the other hand, functions that do take parameters are reachable through HTTP
POST requests.
While the API exposes ten functions overall, only two of these are HTTP GET functions, more
specifically /api and /newSecretKey. In other words, the remaining eight functions all take
parameters to be able to produce the result.
4.2.1 HTTP GET Functions
By calling the /api function as a HTTP GET request, the JSON object shown in Listing 4.2 is
returned by the web service. Admittedly, this object is rather large as it contains information
about all the functions exposed by the web service API.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : "The API − A l l v al i d function c a l l s return a JSON object " ,
4 " content " : [
5 {
6 " function " : "announce" ,
7 "method" : "POST" ,
8 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l t h i s function to manually announce a torrent on the
9 system ’ s tracker . " ,
10 "params" : [
11 " f i l e "
12 ] ,
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13 " args " : [
14 " binary "
15 ] ,
16 " returns " : "The torrent ’ s new unique f i l e name. "
17 } ,
18 {
19 " function " : " api " ,
20 "method" : "GET" ,
21 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l ing t h i s function gives an overview of the API . "
22 } ,
23 {
24 " function " : " decrypt " ,
25 "method" : "POST" ,
26 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l ing t h i s function attempts to decrypt the given ciphertext
27 with the given secret key . " ,
28 "params" : [
29 " ciphertext " ,
30 " secretKey "
31 ] ,
32 " args " : [
33 "base64" ,
34 "base64"
35 ] ,
36 " returns " : "The r e s u l t i n g p l a i n t e x t . "
37 } ,
38 {
39 " function " : "download" ,
40 "method" : "POST" ,
41 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l t h i s function to download an encrypted torrent . The public key
42 r e f e r s to the destination ’ s public key and must r e f l e c t a
43 corresponding c a l l to the share function . " ,
44 "params" : [
45 "fileName" ,
46 " publicKey "
47 ] ,
48 " args " : [
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49 " s t r i n g " ,
50 "base64"
51 ] ,
52 " returns " : "The torrent f i l e encrypted under the given public key and
53 encoded as a Base64 s t r i n g . "
54 } ,
55 {
56 " function " : "newPublicKey" ,
57 "method" : "POST" ,
58 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l ing t h i s function generates a new public key . " ,
59 "params" : [
60 " secretKey "
61 ] ,
62 " args " : [
63 "base64"
64 ] ,
65 " returns " : "The new public key . "
66 } ,
67 {
68 " function " : "newReEncryptionKey" ,
69 "method" : "POST" ,
70 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l ing t h i s function generates a new re−encryption key . " ,
71 "params" : [
72 " secretKey " ,
73 " publicKey "
74 ] ,
75 " args " : [
76 "base64" ,
77 "base64"
78 ] ,
79 " returns " : "The new re−encryption key . "
80 } ,
81 {
82 " function " : "newSecretKey" ,
83 "method" : "GET" ,
84 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l ing t h i s function generates a new secret key . " ,
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85 " returns " : "The new secret key . "
86 } ,
87 {
88 " function " : "newTorrent" ,
89 "method" : "POST" ,
90 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l t h i s function to generate a new torrent for the given f i l e .
91 ( Note : nothing i s stored on the server ) " ,
92 "params" : [
93 " f i l e "
94 ] ,
95 " args " : [
96 " binary "
97 ] ,
98 " returns " : "A new torrent f i l e encoded as a Base64 s t r i n g . "
99 } ,
100 {
101 " function " : " share " ,
102 "method" : "POST" ,
103 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l t h i s function to share a torrent with the given public key
104 holder . The corresponding re−encryption key should derive from the
105 source ’ s secret key and the destination ’ s public key . " ,
106 "params" : [
107 "fileName" ,
108 " publicKey " ,
109 " reEncryptionKey "
110 ] ,
111 " args " : [
112 " s t r i n g " ,
113 "base64" ,
114 "base64"
115 ] ,
116 " returns " : "True i f share was successful , f a l s e otherwise . "
117 } ,
118 {
119 " function " : "upload" ,
120 "method" : "POST" ,
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121 " d e t a i l s " : " Cal l t h i s function to upload a torrent f i l e . The torrent
122 w i l l be encrypted with the given public key . " ,
123 "params" : [
124 " f i l e " ,
125 " publicKey "
126 ] ,
127 " args " : [
128 " binary " ,
129 "base64"
130 ] ,
131 " returns " : "The uploaded torrent ’ s new unique f i l e name. "
132 }
133 ]
134 }
Listing 4.2: JSON Object Response - /api
Note that the content variable in the above JSON object result is in fact an array of ApiItem
objects, as shown in Listing 4.3. While some might argue the result from calling /api is cum-
bersome and excessive, the truth is that because it is a JSON object it is in fact exceptionally
easy to handle by the invoker. There exists very good tools for parsing JSON objects out there,
so managing the object in Listing 4.2 is no problem.
1 public class ApiItem implements Comparable<ApiItem> {
2 private String function ;
3 private String method ;
4 private String d e t a i l s ;
5 private String [ ] params ;
6 private String [ ] args ;
7 private String returns ;
8 }
Listing 4.3: ApiItem.java
Similarly, by calling the /newSecretKey function as a HTTP GET request, the JSON object
shown in Listing 4.4 is returned by the web service. This object is much smaller than the object
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returned from /api, as its content variable simply represents a system generated secret key.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : " Secret key generated " ,
4 " content " : " f y I + J +LgyTwxHEwrYvDEnMyZrlM="
5 }
Listing 4.4: JSON Object Response - /newSecretKey
4.2.2 HTTP POST Functions
The following tests work by invoking HTTP POST requests to the web service as multipart/form-
data. This encoding type is required when sending files as parameters. Note that all the HTTP
POST requests are assumed multipart/form-data requests in the web service’s source code.
Note that some of the following API function tests take cryptographic parameters such as se-
cret keys, public keys, ciphertext etc. Because of this and in the spirit of reducing paper redun-
dancy, the following references to SK A, PK A, SKB , PKB , RK A→B and similar variables all refer to
the values with the same name introduced/generated in the Cryptography Tests section.
By calling the /newTorrent function with the parameter file set to an arbitrary file such as
a document or picture, the JSON object shown in Listing 4.5 is returned by the web service.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : "New torrent generated " ,
4 " content " : "ZDg6YW5ub3VuY2UzMTpodHRwczovLzEwLjAuNS45MDo2OTY5L2Fubm91bmNlMTA6Y3JlYX
5 RlZCBieTM3Om5vLnVpcy5tc2FsdGUudGhlc2lzLmJpdF90b3JyZW50LnV0aWwxMzpjcmVh
6 dGlvbiBkYXRlaTE0MzEwODA0MzRlNDppbmZvZDY6YXRva2VuMTQ6c2VjdXJpdHlfdG9rZW
7 42Omxlbmd0aGkyMTAyNmU0Om5hbWU5OjdGZUl3LmpwZzEyOnBpZWNlIGxlbmd0aGkyNTYw
8 MDBlNjpwaWVjZXMyMDqsZpgwyocXSlB75FPdwiAKokYCDc6cHJpdmF0ZWkxZWVl"
9 }
Listing 4.5: JSON Object Response - /newTorrent
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The content variable in the above result is a Base64 encoding of a torrent/metadata file
corresponding to the contents of the fileparameter set in the HTTP request. Any programming
language can easily convert this encoded string to a .torrent file for further use. For convenience,
Listing 4.6 shows the decoded version of this string. We can see that this is a valid Bencoded
torrent.
1 "d8 : announce31 : https : / / 1 0 . 0 . 5 . 9 0 : 6 9 6 9 / announce10 : created by37 : no . uis . msalte . t h e s i s .
2 b i t _ t o r r e n t . u t i l 1 3 : creationdatei1430756428e4 : infod6 : atoken14 : security_token6 :
3 lengthi76e4 : name8 : t e s t . txt12 : piece lengthi256000e6 : pieces20 : < snip > : 7 : privatei1eee "
Listing 4.6: System Generated Torrent File
By calling the /announce function with the parameter file set to a valid torrent file, the
JSON object shown in Listing 4.7 is returned by the web service.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : " Torrent announced on the tracker " ,
4 " content " : " e3e7f325−31f7−4d05−97b2−b8fb5f574ad1 . torrent "
5 }
Listing 4.7: JSON Object Response - /announce
As the message variable in the above result indicates, this function call resulted in the shar-
ing system’s BitTorrent tracker to start announcing this torrent. The content variable represents
the torrent’s id, which is equal to the torrent’s file name. Note that this function only tells the
tracker to start announcing the torrent. Other than that, it does not interact with the underlying
sharing system in any capacity. The API’s upload function is the go-to function for introducing
a new torrent to the sharing system. The purpose of the announce function is to manually tell
the tracker to start announcing a torrent. This will be necessary after application restart.
By calling the /newPublicKey function with the parameter secretKey set to SK A, the JSON
object shown in Listing 4.8 is returned by the web service.
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1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : " Public key generated " ,
4 " content " : "YGuRNXMkslbnb8+TMR2ZKlT16Gx0vdSVDnRk52RJ4QrzjJ2RuztQFlBQc1rEIHf6mm
5 EsWKR3bpHmoWStbWPpgPVj4Iq946gyA7pJQX4UfVYwlJbYOPI6upbMUcwxxqWljNSp
6 v/2F2CW6N25q7M9U9NenAEcnNpCDZOQZk8A38="
7 }
Listing 4.8: JSON Object Response - /newPublicKey
The message variable in the above result explains the outcome of this function call rather
well. The content variable contains the public key corresponding to the parameter given secret
key. Note that the content variable is equal to PK A. This makes sense, as there is always a single
public key corresponding to a single secret key.
By calling the /newReEncryptionKey function with the parameter secretKey set to SK A
and the parameter publicKey set to PKB , the JSON object shown in Listing 4.9 is returned by
the web service.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : "Re−encryption key generated " ,
4 " content " : "P6PrrTuwAqnfovO5Zf12Iolj8z4OxLe5IZkX1y0p3lTuPzMK04NJcNqmft35nYp7EK4m6CwaW
5 FC6RWfkNf3fZg2rdbZEnYwhdNEnoSxLvfkkydF1lcSk5mce0WNlGqY43nFgPO6crpsg/BJZdx
6 TC+Ju /QWp0jZAzbQbyvg8d/Y="
7 }
Listing 4.9: JSON Object Response - /newReEncryptionKey
Again, the message variable in the above result explains the outcome of this function call
rather well. The content variable contains the re-encryption key corresponding to source SK A
and destination PKB . Note that the content variable is equal to RK A→B . Again, this makes
sense, as there is always a single re-encryption key applicable for re-encryption from party A to
party B.
By calling the /upload function with the parameter file set to a valid torrent file and the
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 68
parameter publicKey set to PK A, the JSON object shown in Listing 4.10 is returned by the web
service.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : " Torrent uploaded successfuly " ,
4 " content " : " e3e7f325−31f7−4d05−97b2−b8fb5f574ad1 . torrent "
5 }
Listing 4.10: JSON Object Response - /upload
Again, the message variable in the above result explains the outcome of this function call
rather well, the upload was successful. The content variable reflects the uniquely generated
torrent id in the underlying sharing system. Note that this function call initiates a rather com-
plex procedure. Firstly, the sharing system announces the torrent on its embedded BitTorrent
tracker before it encrypts the torrent with the PK A parameter. The resulting ciphertext is then
stored in the system’s key-value store/database torrents where the torrent id is the key and the
ciphertext is the value. It is also worth noting that the caller will need to write down the gen-
erated torrent id somewhere, as it is the only way of identifying this particular torrent in the
sharing system. As we shall see, the next function test (/share) will take the torrent id as one of
its parameters.
By calling the /share function with the parameter fileName set to "e3e7f325-31f7-4d05-
97b2-b8fb5f574ad1.torrent", the parameter publicKey set to PKB and the parameter
reEncryptionKey set to RK A→B , the JSON object shown in Listing 4.11 is returned by the web
service.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : " Torrent e3e7f325−31f7−4d05−97b2−b8fb5f574ad1 . torrent shared" ,
4 " content " : " true "
5 }
Listing 4.11: JSON Object Response - /share
Again, the message variable in the above result explains the outcome of this function call
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rather well. Note that this function call will share the torrent with id equal to the fileName pa-
rameter with the public key holder of PKB . The RK A→B parameter is used by the sharing system
to grant this access request. This is achieved by storing a record in the key-value store/database
shares where the torrent id is the key and the key tuple (PKB , RK A→B ) is the value. If a torrent
matching this particular id is already present in the database, the procedure will simply append
the key tuple to the current value, indicating that more than one user is currently on the receiv-
ing end of this torrent.
By calling the /download function with the parameter fileName set to "e3e7f325-31f7-
4d05-97b2-b8fb5f574ad1.torrent" and the parameter publicKey set to PKB , the JSON ob-
ject shown in Listing 4.12 is returned by the web service.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : "Download granted " ,
4 " content " : "BexCIhmyW5v9C5iiUQ6ESSn42gP/0JhGMADFawR6SqiDLN076Y1iUmHt85p7vXeevOQdp3sM
5 mDTZKC0gyauDZ0ZzSbuCkk7dxHlqf7er+FaDDkFdeYYg9A5cZNOpS2DU0foNIri4mNnCjsQ2
6 Jkpspq8taTlEJn+56jjngAroyTITVy /KuqdfCzDOIxIGm6MTEX5AoDoaSE3Jy8GEJae7Sdgf
7 wqQ6um8KCb1TGKoQymOQoINxzitMWuIvL+u8g/CGOC52JiOmfb0alJdHBEXlVCutAYy1+HZ8
8 5Rho4zcy+DgAKvNZ90spMBUscNKoqX38cagyNOyqOnX04+tGGLwbbTVXpnosIjZR1PemPqSa
9 FM6Ejq8zRjsGr9cBGlNLxp5ly1otNlHozY8KcReRSTnmDIM6wQxwla8gSbpLAugTqSkTxGHx
10 pF/69 oI /EpwDbw9NJB4hzOUnBrlgsdIwe0dPxePsaTOM5NMIqM2a6w1FHZk0/JwbKBD6dtHm
11 NAg5yvPpdkHKr/ikRJrfCfwp4Drg0vh1mmG4WqjcSrQCrLcCqfCk8j15EpBhFrGU0zrZLU83
12 /ONQExK7IQ1HKC4blpleQzdNMGcqirmkyH9mbK4CFNU6XannXOaHrYhOoEi99T2nEKzRhgcq
13 na31RE+uKNBirn/neUZbdHc8gVXnPprgvbk="
14 }
Listing 4.12: JSON Object Response - /download
Again, the message variable in the above result explains the outcome of this function rather
well. The content variable however, represents the re-encrypted torrent ciphertext. To clarify,
this ciphertext is only compatible for decryption with the secret key SKB . This is the result of the
sharing system’s proxy re-encryption capabilities. Upon calling /download, the sharing system
looked up the parameter given torrent id in its database and found the re-encryption key RK A→B
in the key tuple identified by PKB .
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1 {
2 " status " : 400 ,
3 "message" : "No access or f i l e does not e x i s t "
4 }
Listing 4.13: JSON Object Response - /download - Invalid Parameters
Listing 4.13 shows the JSON object returned by the web service when calling /download and
the sharing system does not find a database record corresponding to either of the parameters.
By calling the /decrypt function with the parameter ciphertext set to the content vari-
able from Listing 4.12 and the parameter secretKey set to SKB , the JSON object shown in List-
ing 4.14 is returned by the web service.
1 {
2 " status " : 200 ,
3 "message" : " Decryption successful " ,
4 " content " : "ZDg6YW5ub3VuY2UzMTpodHRwczovLzEwLjAuNS45MDo2OTY5L2Fubm91bmNlMTA6Y3JlYXR
5 lZCBieTM3Om5vLnVpcy5tc2FsdGUudGhlc2lzLmJpdF90b3JyZW50LnV0aWwxMzpjcmVhdG
6 lvbiBkYXRlaTE0MzA3NTY0MjhlNDppbmZvZDY6YXRva2VuMTQ6c2VjdXJpdHlfdG9rZW42O
7 mxlbmd0aGk3NmU0Om5hbWU4OnRlc3QudHh0MTI6cGllY2UgbGVuZ3RoaTI1NjAwMGU2OnBp
8 ZWNlczIwOpvaUx2lW9otjUUQjJNJzSbIbvk6Nzpwcml2YXRlaTFlZWU="
9 }
Listing 4.14: JSON Object Response - /decrypt
The message variable indicates that the decryption was successful. This means that the
content variable now reflects the initial torrent file as Base64 encoded plaintext. Decoding this
string reveals the torrent shown in Listing 4.15. As we can see, this is the exact same Bencoded
torrent as the one in Listing 4.6.
1 "d8 : announce31 : https : / / 1 0 . 0 . 5 . 9 0 : 6 9 6 9 / announce10 : created by37 : no . uis . msalte . t h e s i s .
2 b i t _ t o r r e n t . u t i l 1 3 : creationdatei1430756428e4 : infod6 : atoken14 : security_token6 :
3 lengthi76e4 : name8 : t e s t . txt12 : piece lengthi256000e6 : pieces20 : < snip > : 7 : privatei1eee "
Listing 4.15: Decrypted Ciphertext
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To conclude the above tests, it is apparent that the sharing system is working as intended.
Party A is able to share a file with party B exclusively by calling the functions exposed by the
web service API. This goes to show how easy it is to incorporate the sharing system into existing
applications. Any programming language is perfectly capable of invoking these function calls
and parsing/interpreting the resulting JSON objects.
Chapter 5
Discussion
The following section will primarily make a short analysis over what the test results from the pre-
vious chapter mean. There will also be a brief comparison of the thesis sharing system against
other sharing practices in use today. Finally, the text will present a short discussion of the thesis
sharing system’s limitations and shortcomings.
As demonstrated, the thesis sharing system is fully capable of functioning as a file sharing
system. As we have seen, the system’s proxy re-cryptography capabilities is able to provide the
rest of the system with a secure encryption mechanism. Moreover, the web service API exposes
enough functionality such that existing applications may easily incorporate the system to pro-
vide their users with secure sharing.
When comparing the sharing system with other practices for sharing that is commonly in
use today, this work is able to provide a major advantage. This advantage is specifically the sys-
tem’s ability to re-encrypt ciphertexts without accessing the underlying plaintext. Because of the
system’s implementation of proxy re-encryption, the sharing system is able to modify encrypted
ciphertexts so that they are compatible for decryption by other keys. All this can happen with-
out security concern, as the system exclusively operate on publicly available information. To
elaborate on the reasoning for the above claim, we can see that the thesis sharing system elim-
inates the primary concern of many other sharing systems in use today where re-encryption
must follow a preceding decryption to plaintext. Decrypting content before re-encryption is a
huge security concern that the thesis sharing system is able to avoid.
Moreover, as the thesis sharing system uses the proxy re-encryption primitive, it only needs
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to store a single ciphertext per file. This is opposed to other sharing systems where it is necessary
to store one ciphertext per user on the receiving end of a file sharing operation, i.e. one cipher-
text per decryption key. In the thesis sharing system, the underlying database only contain the
original ciphertext encrypted by the file’s source. Upon sharing, the sharing system will modify
this single ciphertext for compatibility with the destination’s decryption key. This conversion
is accomplished by applying the publicly available re-encryption key to the ciphertext. There
is no necessity for the sharing system to store the resulting ciphertext anywhere, just deliver it
to the recipient. Exclusively storing the original ciphertext is satisfactory. It is also worth noting
that the thesis sharing system is able to delegate access while the original file source is offline, as
long as it has previously been supplied with the required re-encryption key, i.e. if the file source
invoked the share() function at some point.
On the other hand, while the thesis sharing system is able to introduce an improved sharing
mechanism, it will not be able to eliminate all security concerns for sharing files on the Internet.
If the users are hosting their files on compromised locations, whether it is on cloud storage
services or otherwise, the security algorithms in use on these locations will obviously affect the
security of the files taking part in the sharing system. However, as mentioned, the thesis sharing
system makes significant improvements on many of today’s sharing practices and is thereby a
big step in the right direction.
Additionally, the thesis sharing system is not compatible with all available BitTorrent clients.
Compatible clients must as mentioned implement the Vuze specification for Message Stream
Encryption (MSE).
When it comes to key management, the sharing system does not offer anything in this area.
When users have generated their respective key pairs for use in the sharing system, these keys
will remain their keys indefinitely. There is no system in place for key renewal. However, as this
was not in the thesis’ scope and because there are several such systems available as open source
out there, this particular limitation is rather negligible.
While considering the sharing system’s limitations, it is still able to make significant security
improvements compared with many of today’s practices. It does eliminate some of the most
obvious weaknesses, but not all.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The following will primarily compare the thesis’ original objectives with the results and discus-
sion. Moreover, it will describe some recommendations for future work.
To reiterate the thesis objectives from Chapter 1.2, the following shows them again in no
particular order. Develop a file sharing system that:
1. Satisfies today’s security requirements
2. Handles arbitrary file types and sizes
3. Enables file owners to host their files on arbitrary locations
4. Does not require file owners to remain online indefinitely
5. Can easily be incorporated into existing applications
6. Works on all platforms
From the above objectives, and when comparing them to the resulting sharing system’s ca-
pabilities, it can be argued that all the initial objectives has been met. The thesis sharing system
is able to provide a secure sharing mechanism that handles arbitrary file types and sizes. It also
enables file owners to host their files on arbitrary locations, albeit this initially attractive prop-
erty also has the side effect of being a potential security concern, depending on the file owner’s
particular file system location.
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Since the thesis sharing system relies on the (modified) BitTorrent protocol for file transfer
capability, the sharing system does not require file owners to remain online. Users can join and
leave the system as they please, conveniently continuing their progress from where they left off.
Because the sharing system is exposed through a standardized web service API, it can eas-
ily be incorporated into existing applications while also remaining platform independent. All
platforms have easily available tools for invoking HTTP requests and parsing JSON responses.
One of the primary weaknesses of the thesis sharing system is the fact that is only that, a
sharing system. The overall system’s security is heavily dependent on the underlying security
of the files taking part in the sharing processes. While the thesis sharing system does provide
secure sharing, it does not interfere with the underlying file systems. This means that if file
owners host their files on insecure locations, the fact that he or she is able to share files securely
becomes second rate. Because of this, if a future extension of the thesis sharing system included
its own storage entity, it might be possible to provide a completely secure cloud storage system.
Because of the sharing system’s nature, an incorporation into a cloud storage service, like any
other application, is arguably one of its primary intentional use cases. As such, incorporating
the sharing system in a cloud storage service seems like an obvious suggestion for future work.
As the paper mentions frequently, we are seeing a huge increase in users moving their private
files from their own expensive hardware to inexpensive cloud storage services. Again, while this
is very convenient, there are rather big security questions remaining unanswered in many of
these cases.
Other areas of the thesis sharing system that would benefit from future work is its key man-
agement capability and the BitTorrent client support. Currently, there is no key renewal system
in place, which some might argue is rather inconvenient. While this was never part of the thesis
scope, it might be a nice convenience to have in the future. When talking about BitTorrent client
support, there are two ways to go. On one hand, it would be nice to be able to support arbitrary
BitTorrent clients, not only those implementing the Vuze MSE specification, as is the case now.
However, on the other hand, by implementing a custom BitTorrent client as an exclusive part of
the sharing system, one would gain significantly more control over client behavior. This would
of course lead to a more narrow system, in which the users must use a specific BitTorrent client
to be able to partake. In any case, a close examination of this tradeoff would be necessary.
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Finally, the sharing system would benefit greatly in the convenience department if it were
to support identity-based cryptography and/or group sharing. Identity-based cryptosystems
are systems in which its users are able to use personal information such as e-mail address or
IP address as their public key component. Whether this is possible in the current proxy re-
encryption scheme would need to be found out. Group sharing would potentially eliminate the
current necessity to invoke the sharing procedure once per recipient user, and instead grant the
ability to share with a large group of users at a time.
Appendix A
Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
BT BitTorrent
CSP Cloud Storage Provider
CSSP Cloud Storage Service Provider
DLP Discrete Logarithm Problem
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ISP Internet Service Provider
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
P2P Peer to Peer
PBC Pairing Based Cryptography
PRE Proxy Re-Encryption
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TLS Transport Layer Security
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Modifications to ttorrent
The following will briefly summarize the changes made to the ttorrent library. Again, note that
the ttorrent library is licensed under the Apache Software License version 2.0. Every modified
Java class will have its complete location (including package) shown here. That way, it will be
easy to track down modified code.
com.turn.ttorrent.common.Torrent -
• Added an additional method signature for create() that takes a security token pa-
rameter.
• Modified the private method create() to support the aforementioned security to-
ken parameter. This method will append the security token to a torrent’s info dictio-
nary. Moreover, it will also set its private flag to ’1’.
com.turn.ttorrent.tracker.Tracker -
• The method getAnnounceUrl() will append ’https’ to the returned string, instead
of ’http’.
com.turn.ttorrent.tracker.Tracker.TrackerThread -
• This inner class’ call to connection.connect() includes a reference to no.uis.
msalte.thesis.common.security.SecurityConstants.SSL_CONTEXT. This is a
static reference to a javax.net.ssl.SSLContext object.
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com.turn.ttorrent.tracker.TrackerService -
• The method process() makes sure incoming HTTP GET requests include the ’re-
quirecrypto’ flag and that it is set to ’1’. If this is not the case, HTTP status 406 Not
Acceptable is returned.
com.turn.ttorrent.client.announce.HTTPTrackerClient -
• Note that this particular modification does not affect the thesis sharing system di-
rectly. The reason for the following change was primarily for testing purposes (to be
able to examine BitTorrent client behavior during debugging).
• Modified the announce() method to support HTTPS. Now uses classes HttpClient
and GetMethod from the Apache Commons library.
HttpClient provides full support for HTTP over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or IETF
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols by leveraging the Java Secure Socket Exten-
sion (JSSE) [34].
com.turn.ttorrent.common.protocol.HTTPAnnounceRequestMessage -
• The method parse() is modified to include parsing of the ’requirescrypto’ and ’cryp-
toport’ parameters.
Appendix C
Java Projects Setup
The following will explain how to setup the respective thesis sharing system Java projects in the
Eclipse IDE on a Windows environment.
As described in the paper, the thesis sharing system consists of several Java projects. These
are primarily the five projects common, crypto, bit-torrent, secure-share and web-service.
However, the submission source code contains an additional sixth project named ttorrent.
This is the modified version of the ttorrent library that the paper mentions frequently.
In the compressed file attached to the submission PDF file, the following folder structure is
available.
app-dir/ Directory
bit-torrent/ Java Maven Project
common/ Java Maven Project
crypto/ Java Maven Project
secure-share/ Java Maven Project
ttorrent/ Java Maven Project
web-service/ Java Maven Project
As shown in the above, there are seven folders present in the compressed file. These folders
represent the main application directory known as app-dir/ as well as the six aforementioned
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Java projects. The app-dir/ directory contains all the files and subdirectories in use by the shar-
ing system.
By unpacking the compressed file, it is easy to import the Java Maven projects into Eclipse.
Start by selecting File → Import... → Existing Maven Projects. In the dialog window that ap-
pears, select the Browse... button next to the Root Directory input box. From the subsequent
dialog window, find the root directory of the particular project to be imported (one of the six
folders above) before pressing Finish. Repeat this procedure for every project successively. Be-
cause these projects are Maven projects referencing each other in their respective pom.xml files,
the dependencies between them should primarily be working automatically. However, there is
one exception. The crypto project needs to know about the JPBC library. The respective jar files
for the JPBC library reside in the app-dir/jars/ directory. To add these jars to the project’s build
path, Right-click the crypto project → Build Path → Add External Archives.... In the following
dialog window, browse to app-dir/jars/, select both jpbc-api-2.0.0.jar and jpbc-plaf-2.0.0.jar,
before pressing Open.
After importing the six projects by following the above, it is time to make some modifications.
Make sure that the projects are compiling using a Java Runtime Environment (JRE) version 6 or
later. Unless this is the case, their use of the @Override annotation will produce compilation
errors.
Moreover, make sure that the JAVA_HOME environment variable is set in the operating system.
This variable should point to the parent directory containing the Java Runtime Environment
(JRE). A sample location for the JRE on a Windows system is "C:\Program Files\Java\jre1.8.0_20".
After setting the JAVA_HOME environment variable, append the bin directory at "<JAVA_HOME>/bin"
to the PATH environment variable.
After setting/updating the environment variables, it is time to generate a server certificate to
enable the sharing system’s HTTPS capability. To do this, we will use a tool known as the Java
keytool [35]. This is an application located at "<JAVA_HOME>/bin/keytool.exe" on Windows
systems.
Open a command line in administrator mode and execute the following commands. Re-
member to substitute "<pw>" with your desired password and "<JAVA_HOME>" with your
JAVA_HOME environment variable.
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<JAVA_HOME>\bin\keytool -genkey -alias secure-share -keyalg RSA -keypass <pw>
-storepass <pw> -keystore secure-share.jks
<JAVA_HOME>\bin\keytool -export -alias secure-share -storepass <pw>
-file secure-share.cer -keystore secure-share.jks
<JAVA_HOME>\bin\keytool -import -v -trustcacerts -alias secure-share
-file secure-share.cer
-keystore "<JAVA_HOME>\lib\security\cacerts"
-keypass <pw> -storepass changeit
After following the instructions presented by the above procedure, the resulting output files
should be secure-share.jks and secure-share.cer. Move these two files into the app-dir/tls/ di-
rectory. Edit the file keystore.pw present on this location to reflect the same keystore password
as used in the certificate generation procedure (<pw>).
Now that we have generated the server certificate, navigate to the class no.uis.msalte.
thesis.common.AppConstants.java in the common project. This class consists of several static
string variables, all of which has had some documentation attached to explain their significance.
The primary objective in modifying this source file is to make sure that the DIR_APP variable is
pointing to the file system location of app-dir/ and that the TRACKER_HOSTNAME variable con-
tains the server’s hostname. Other than this, it is perfectly fine to keep the default values.
When the above is complete, it is possible to test whether everything is working correctly by
running the unit tests in the web-service project. Navigate to no.uis.msalte.thesis.web_
service.tests.AllTests.java and select Run → Run As → JUnit Test. If all three tests pass,
everything should be working as intended.
Now that the project setup is complete, start the web service through the main() method in
no.uis.msalte.thesis.web-service.App.java. When the program is running, access the
web service API through https://hostname:port/api. The default port is 9090.
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